This text was written by the first Prime Minister of the First Republic of Armenia, Hovhannes Kajaznuni in 1924 in Bucharest. Kajaznuni was initially in favour of finding common ground with Turkey and Turks especially during his first tenure as Prime Minister. Later on, once Armenia became part of the Soviet Union, he backed the idea that Armenians around the world should support Soviet Armenia.
Leon Aslanov, translator’s not
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As Kajaznuni was preparing to return to Soviet Armenia, in a public debate with his former ARF colleagues, he asserted that Bolshevik Soviet Russia and the Soviet Union would not collapse in the coming years – as his colleagues claimed on the contrary.
And so, organising ourselves as a state became a full-fledged requirement, a historical necessity, which sought to serve the Armenian nation during and after the Great War, in the context of the re-examination of the old political map and the formation of new state entities.
This issue has been pertinent for the past 7 years, but 7 years are far too few for establishing a state and Armenia is still in a state of organisational panic.
How should the Armenian nation solve this difficult issue?
Half of the Armenian people are separated and torn from their motherland, reduced to dust and dispersed across the 4 corners of the world. In the best case scenario, this represents only a supportive or reserve force for the state, nothing more. The second half of the Armenian people represent the basic element of the state – the one million Armenians who are living on their homeland, in the Ararat valley and its environs – they are the ones who must construct the infrastructure of the Armenian state.
Armenia is small and void of riches. It is cut off from the main communication routes. It is pressed and closed off by its rough mountain range.
The population of Armenia is small, poor and illiterate. It is inept when it comes to statesmanship and the construction of the state.
Can such a people in such a country form a state?
If they wish to live then they are obliged to do so. The reality is that the people are already on this path. The foundation of the state was laid on 28th May 1918 and now we have the Soviet Republic of Armenia.
Is this republic really a state?
It is a state, albeit not one that stands on its own two feet and rules itself. In other words, it is neither completely independent nor completely free because it is linked in an alliance to the other Transcaucasian republics (Azerbaijan and Georgia) and these countries together are part of the larger Soviet Union.
The Soviet Republic of Armenia is legally a state just as Württemberg is a republic in the German Union, the Neuchâtel canton in the Swiss Confederation, or the state of California in the North American United States. It is as much a state as Victoria in the Australian Federation, Ontario in Canada, or Transvaal in the South African Federation.
Can this semi-independent state satisfy Armenia’s demand to organise as a state? – That very authoritative demand, which has been politicised and has subjected the people in Armenia to great calamities.
Yes, it can – if not completely then at least to a large extent.
The system in which one establishes collective states and makes allies is optimal for small and weak nations like the Armenian one. It is not simply the optimal option, but most often the only one.
Armenia’s size, its geographical position, level of civilisation, economic capacities, historical past and current political situation are not conducive to forming a self-reliant state.
The Armenia of today cannot survive with its own means. It is required to seek constant and reliable support from external forces. In other words, it has to ally with other states because only a long-standing and solid alliance can be considered a strong pillar on which to rely. Coincidental relations, temporary and partial agreements cannot provide security for an internally weak state.
Who should Armenia ally itself with?
Naturally, with its immediate neighbours – Georgia and Azerbaijan – since it is with these countries that Armenia is intimately linked geographically and economically, and also historically, in part.
Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and a series of other national-political units (Abkhazia, Ajaria, South Ossetia, Zaqatala and, partly, Dagestan) are natural allies with which to form a state union.
Such a union was formed at the start of 1918 under the name of the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic, in the first phase of the Great Russian Revolution. No sooner had it been formed than it was dissolved. It was re-established three years later, the under the Bolshevik flag.
Why did it collapse only a few weeks after it had been formed?
It collapsed because of internal disputes and the exacerbation and exploitation of these disagreements by external forces.
The three states that formed this alliance were fraught with several border disputes, which had been dormant for years, as well as mutual mistrust, suspicion and fear. Moreover, there were differences in the orientation of foreign policy. Azerbaijan was unconditionally inclined to allying with Turkey, while Georgia had the same orientation with only negligible reservations. Armenia, on the other hand, saw Turkey’s hegemony in the Transcaucasia as not only dangerous, but also fatal to Armenia’s existence.
If the Transcaucasian peoples had been politically a little more mature then, indeed, they would have found a way to solve their internal disputes peacefully and with their own means. But they had not reached that level of maturity and so the alliance collapsed, for it to be restored under external duress.
This is what happened in the recent past.
What about today?
How stable is the situation today? What has changed since 1918 when the Transcaucasians were dismayed at one another, divided into opposing armies and even used weapons against one another?
6 years, and even 6 times 6 years is a short amount of time for disciplining people. It is also an insufficient period of time for fostering sympathy and eliminating the embedded antagonisms between the masses. The Transcaucasian person is today more or less the same as he/she was six years ago. The same disputes persist and the solutions to them require many years and copious work.
One thing, nevertheless, has changed – the Transcaucasia today is not free to decide its own fate but is now part of the Union of Soviet Republics.
This one factor fundamentally changes the situation (both within and outside the Federation) and makes possible that which was meant to look differently.
The sad reality is that the Transcaucasian states, not each one on its own but as the Transcaucasian Federation, are not in a position to lead an independent state. This Federation still requires an external anchor on which to rely. In other words, it has to ally with another state or states.
With whom can Transcaucasia ally as a state entity?
Either Turkey or Russia – there is no third option on the horizon.
Straight after the Great War, when both Turkey and Russia were cruelly defeated, Armenians tied great hopes to Western Europe (specifically victorious England) and the United States of America.
It was the period of “mandates” and “mandators”.
Reality nevertheless proved that those hopes were illusory. We knocked on many doors, wore out many a doorstep, but the “mandatory” from the West never came to save our country and granted us our new-born country.
Why did this not happen?
The circumstances seemed so favourable and tempting…
Turkey, which was defeated and worn out, pulled out its troops from the borders of Transcaucasia and waited in fear for the ruthless verdict of the victors. Its greatest hope and desire that it could have in those days was to save its existence, even just in the depths of Anatolia. Russia, which was also defeated in the battlefield and was internally ridden with a bloody civil conflict, abandoned Transcaucasia and left it in a hurry, leaving the doors behind it wide open. The domineering English Commander-in-Chief was sat in Tbilisi keeping the country together under his command. On the other hand, not only the Armenians, but the other peoples of Transcaucasia were in an urgent panic to form a state or states. They were pleading for help and were ready to fall into the embrace of anybody willing to take them in.
The circumstances were tempting, yes, so tempting that it would be difficult to imagine anything more and it would hardly be possible that this situation would repeat itself again. But nevertheless, nobody was tempted, nobody was enticed, nobody wished to lend a hand and take ownership of something that was seeking an owner.
Why so?
Because, at the end of the day, the great Western states had no interests in Transcaucasia. Even if they did, those interests were did not outweigh the future burden of taking ownership (the burden of an unavoidable conflict with Russia, which was going to happen sooner or later).
That was the situation five or six years ago.
What is the situation like today?
After its stunning victory, Turkey is today not inclined to give to compromises and to the demands of others at Lausanne. As for Russia, it has returned to Transcaucasia. It has put an end to its civil conflict and is organising itself internally, reclaiming its position and influence step by step among the great states.
If in 1918, by avoiding future difficulties, the Western states were not willing or able to take Transcaucasia in its entirety or only Armenia under their wing, then they are even less willing and able today.
It might have been forgivable to put hopes on Western dreams five or six years ago, but today, after Lausanne, it is simply unforgivable. It is unforgivable to not realise that today there are only two real powers, on opposite sides, with whom Transcaucasia (and consequently Armenia) can ally itself: Russia and Turkey.
Either one or the other. There is no third alternative.
It is also not possible to live in between both sides without embracing either one or the other. It is necessary to choose one.
Now, Russia or Turkey?
If this question were to be put to discussion to the whole of Transcaucasia then it is likely, even more than likely, that opinions will unfortunately diverge from one another. It is most probably, now already fortunately, that Armenia (perhaps with a slight exception and against all your arguments) will decidedly and unreservedly opt for Russia.
It would be a futile endeavour to compare Russia and Turkey, independent from the expectations, hopes or fears that Transcaucasia has vis-à-vis its neighbours. The political, economic and cultural advantages undoubtedly lie with Russia and not Turkey. There can only be talk of specific threats that have the potential to divide Transcaucasia and that command Armenians to hold the hand of Russia tightly.
Have a close look at the ethnographic map of Transcaucasia.
It is extremely complicated, intricate and variegated. However, three colours more or less dominate the map: Georgians to the west, Turks/Tatars (Azerbaijanis) to the east, and in the middle, south of the Georgians, are the Armenians. The country belonging to Armenians is cut off from the sea and from the great Transcaucasian route running from Baku to Batumi. It is encircled by a Georgian-Turk (Azerbaijani)-Kurdish-Ajarian ring. The national divisions more or less correspond to the division of states. The (Azerbaijani) Turks are largely found within the borders of Azerbaijan and the Georgians are all within the borders of Georgian. One third of the Armenians, however, are found outside of the borders of Armenia.
This map is unfavourable especially for Armenians.
Remember how political interests manifested themselves during the Great War and how large-scale changes have taken place in and around Transcaucasia in the past few years.
In order to put an end to the burdensome Armenian question, Turkey exiled or massacred and exterminated all the Armenians of the eastern vilayets (provinces). And then, taking advantage of the absence of Russia, Turkey retook the Kars region, which it had lost half a century before and invaded the Surmalu region, which had never been Turkish, was then established on the banks of the Arpachay and Arax rivers, along the southern foot of Masis. It also disjoined Sharur-Nakhijevan from Armenian and linked it politically with Azerbaijan.
As a result of these changes Turkey is separated from Nakhijevan only by the Arax river and Nakhijevan is separated from Azerbaijan by a very short corridor in Armenian Zangezur. The Alyat-Julfa railway, which has almost reached completion, will end that separation and Baku will be linked to Nakhijevan physically, and thus also to Ankara.
It would be naïve to think that these developments are coincidental and a result of unexpected circumstances. It is needless to say that this is a preconceived plan prepared in advance, and a representation of a particular political inclination. As the Ottoman Turks gradually lost their positions in the west and south (the Balkans, Africa, Syria and Arabia), they began to show an open interest in the north-east, towards those countries which they had passed centuries ago and left behind large swathes of their ethnic imprint.
So where will this take Turkey? Firstly, to Azerbaijan.
It would be more correct to say it in the plural: Azerbaijans. Apart from the Transcaucasian Azerbaijan we also have the Persian Azerbaijan, which is just as tempting for Turkey.
However I will not complicate matters, and so I will ignore the second Azerbaijan and consider only the first one.
Turkey has its eye on Azerbaijan. Its motivations are abundantly clear.
Firstly, Azerbaijan, which has over two million Turks in its population, is an important supplement for Turkey from a national state perspective. This is for a Turkey which had hardly 5-6 million Turks in all of Anatolia.
Secondly, by incorporating Azerbaijan, Turkey will establish itself on the banks of the Caspian Sea and it will have a link by sea to Turkestan.
Thirdly, Azerbaijan is so abundantly rich with oil in the Absheron Peninsula (Baku) that it would dazzle not only a poor and bankrupt country like Turkey but any state with an eye on wealth.
This is the expectation. But is it possible? Can Turkey rule over Azerbaijan?
The only obstacle (indeed a colossal obstacle) is Russia. Azerbaijan is itself ready to fully embrace Turkey.
Proof of this is the position it took in the war, especially in the final phase. The “Musavat” party, which was the flag bearer for intellectuals, singlehandedly ruled Azerbaijan in the recent past, representing the Turks of Transcaucasia. It was Turkey’s mere vanguard in our country.
If the voice of “Musavat” is not being heard today, that does not mean that its orientation no longer exists. As soon as Russia’s restrictive influence disappears or wanes, those of the same ideology (perhaps even under the same name) will again come to the fore and attempt to open the doors to Transcaucasia for Turkey. Elements that are opposed to this orientation are few and far between in Azerbaijan. The Azerbaijan Turk working class (concentrated almost completely in Baku), who are linked to the Third International or are advocates of socialist ideology are inclined towards Russia. But their number is so small that they cannot represent any political value. As for the rural population, it is exceedingly illiterate, backward, lazy and disorganised…They will not be able to steer the political orientation, and so the steering wheel will return to the hands of the Musavatists.
The second important power in Transcaucasia, Georgia, is inclined to seek security for its state under the wing of Turkey. It is not only the chauvinists or conservative elements (the waning nobility and its ideological advocates), but also a large proportion of the social-democrat Mensheviks who are so inclined. The politics run by the Mensheviks between 1918-20, as well as the stance adopted by their leaders in Europe, are so ostentatious that they leave no room for doubt.
Azerbaijan is ready and wants to surrender to Turkey, while the Georgians will at least not be opposed to that. Turkey will not meet any resistance from within Transcaucasia, but if it were to (from Armenians and perhaps partly from Georgians), they this resistance would be so negligible that it would be easily eliminated.
The only obstacle is Russia.
And the only way to eliminate this obstacle is to separate Transcaucasia from Russia.
If this were to happen then the rest would take place in and of itself.
If Transcaucasia is cut off from Russia then it would be connected to Turkey – there is no other way. It is highly probable, and indeed favourable for the Turks, that this connection will in the first instance be made as a “federation”. But this federation will inevitably be subject to [Turkish] hegemony and finally outright domination.
In the past we have seen a Russian Transcaucasia, in the future we may see a Turkish Transcaucasia.
Turkey (whether under the Sultan, the Ittihadists or the Kemalists) is not the kind of state with which the newly formed Transcaucasian states can ally themselves without opening themselves up to great risks. Throughout its history, Turkey has been nothing more than a religio-militarist organisation, which has now turned into a national-militarist organisation. Waging war, invading countries with weapons and living on account of the invaded countries is what Turkey has always been – it is its whole essence and only ability it has as a state. Such a state cannot be an ally, but simply a dominating force, in its most harsh and primitive sense.
What about Russia, you may ask? Has it been an “ally” in the past and is it not a “dominating force” in Transcaucasia now? What difference is there between Kemalist Turkey and Bolshevik Russia?
There is a big difference.
The system of alliances is an essential part of the Bolshevik political system. It has not simply been declared as a principle, doctrine or programme, but it has already been employed extensively in the Soviet Union. Turkey has thus far not shown any such intention, neither in practice nor in words. We have not heard, for instance, of the governors in Ankara planning, or intending to plan, for any granting of rights to Kurdistan (let alone allying with it). We see the opposite – they are making every effort to centralise power and nationalise the state, as soon as possible and as completely as possible. A state that, in contrast to the glaring reality, declares that there are no “minorities” within its borders and so cannot grant them “rights” is a state that is psychologically not prepared to make alliances.
Secondly, the [Soviet] Union has no need to suffocate Transcaucasia in order to ensure Russia’s dominance – its dominance is guaranteed by its undefeatable superiority. The situation with Turkey is different. A Transcaucasia that is well organised as a whole state would be equal in power to Turkey. For Turkey to be able to regulate the hypothetical Turkish-Transcaucasian alliance would require it to break apart this internal union, divide Transcaucasia into components that would compete against one another, rely on one of these components in order to repress and subjugate the others. Russia does not have to fear a Transcaucasia that is internally strong, whereas Turkey cannot allow that.
Thirdly, Russia does not have what Turkey has in Transcaucasia – namely Azerbaijan and, partly, Ajaria. Russia has no issue (or need) to expand its national borders since Russians make up a negligible population in Transcaucasia and none of the local peoples are interested in being assimilated into the Russian nation or the Russian state. Whereas the emotional policy that Turkey has adopted will inevitably lead it to connect with the Turks of Transcaucasia and to impose that union to non-Turkish groups, thus neutralising or weakening their influence.
It is not difficult to understand that this essential difference in the situation will mean that Russia and Turkey will naturally have contrasting policies towards Transcaucasia. Transcaucasia can ally with Russia just as, for example, South Africa allies with England. Russia’s state interests will be satisfied, while Turkey has other aims in our region.
Given all this, why would Transcaucasia connect its future to Turkey and what positive expectations could it have?
Russia, with its inexhaustible resources (both material and immaterial), is in a position to give a lot to Transcaucasia, while Turkey will only take without giving anything back, because it has nothing.
What situation will arise especially for Armenia if Turkey, in one way or another, were to establish its dominance in Transcaucasia?
Armenians are within their rights to put forward this issue. If their neighbours (or some of them) are partially threatened by Turkey, then the Armenian people must also express those partial threats that they face and concerns that they have.
Yes, Turkey’s dominance is a fatal threat to Armenia. It is most probable that Turkey would end the political existence of Armenians in Transcaucasia (and partially, perhaps in large numbers, its physical existence).
Armenia unfortunately lies on the path that would take Turkey to Azerbaijan. Whatever path Turkey takes to Baku, whether through the Aras valley or the Kur valley, it is in either case going to come up against the Armenian people (in the Ararat plains and Armenian Highlands), with their national consciousness and political aims. This represents an obstacle and a worrying situation for the future. It is an obstacle that is not so negligible as to be ignored, but also not so great for it to be too difficult to remove.
If Turkey were to be stronger and confident in its power then little Armenia’s existence would certainly not worry Turkey. However, Turkey has gone through a crisis and in order to guarantee its future and strengthen itself from within, it needs to expand its state borders, not to invade land, but to annex co-ethnic regions.
So the first thing it needs is Azerbaijan.
While the Armenian in Armenia will remain a foreign, alien and unabsorbable element. However much that element shows itself to not be a threat under external pressure, to remain silent and avoid making itself seen, circumstances may change and they may create tensions in the environment and cause certain difficulties…
Armenians and Armenia seem to not represent a great danger to present or future Turkey, but it is clear that Turkey would feel calmer and safer if they were to cease to exist.
How will they cease to exist?
Turkey knows how to do this very clearly and resolutely. It does not require a new method. It will use the same method that it employed so successfully in 1915 in the Armenian vilayets and also in 1918 and 1920 in Transcaucasian Armenia.
Neither Azerbaijan nor Georgia nor the whole of Transcaucasia can stop Turkey from smothering Armenia, as they were unable to do so or (more correctly) were unwilling to do so in 1918.
The only way to stop the threat of Turkey is to embrace Russia.
And this is why if there were to be a choice, then then Transcaucasian Armenian would without hesitation choose Russia.
But you say that our neighbours, the Georgians and Azerbaijanis, do not want Russian (Russia in general and especially not the Bolsheviks…). Would our choice not ruin co-existence in Transcaucasia, rile up our neighbours against us and prevent us from living in peace with those very people from whom we are inseparable and with whom we must think first and foremost how we must live?
This is a serious objection, the most serious of them all, if not the only serious objection that you have.
However serious and valid that objection may be, the issue cannot be resolved in favour of Turkey.
If, as you assume, a Turkish-Tatar-Georgian alliance is formed against Russia (whether Soviet or non-Soviet), Armenia cannot trust either the Turks nor the Georgians for very serious reasons (especially those Turks and Georgians who form that alliance).
Armenia must cling to Russia and it must try to keep the whole of Transcaucasia under Russian influence, even if it is against the will of our neighbours.
It is very difficult to express these words, but it must be said straightforwardly.
In April 1918, when the Armenians, along with the Azerbaijanis and Georgians at the Seym, under the pressure of Turkey, declared that Transcaucasia was separated from Russia, there was no room to make another choice at that time of crisis. But there was this belief that the great Western states (whom we called “allies”) were on its side and would sooner or later come and find ways to restrain Turkey.
Reality came to show that Armenia has no allies in the West. Its real ally is Russia and it is only thanks to Russia that the name of the “Republic of Armenia” has not been erased, that it has not been taken out of world maps.
Indeed, co-existence in Transcaucasia and friendly relations with its immediate neighbours is extremely important for Armenia. However, friendly relations and the alliance with Russia are even more important.
It is clear that allying with Russia over the heads of Georgia and Azerbaijan and against their will is an extremely vulnerable and dangerous situation that cannot be tolerated for a long time and cannot been considered to be a political ideal.
The ideal remains a close and unbidden Transcaucasian alliance in an all-Russian union.
The Bolsheviks like to assert (perhaps they really do believe), that they have reached the ideal of a perfect co-existence within Transcaucasia and that Transcaucasia has linked itself to Russia willingly and knowingly.
This is self-deception at the very least.
This is not the case today, but it can be the case tomorrow and it undoubtedly has to be so.
Those elements (in Azerbaijan, Georgia and, partly, Armenia), that are now in opposition to Russia and are still active must gradually cede their place to other elements that are politically more healthy, conscious and mature. I do not mean the communist proletariat, which is still a foreign phenomenon in our reality and will continue to be a powerless force in Transcaucasia in the long run, but I mean the “Demos” – the working masses and especially the rural population. Their real needs and demands will be better satisfied and assured under the Russian domain than the Turkish domain. This is not only true for Armenia and Georgia, but also for Turkish Azerbaijan.
This truth is the optimal guarantee for the future.
This truth has unfortunately not been grasped across Transcaucasia and is far from being prevalent. The anti-Russian mood (under the name of anti-Bolshevism) is powerful in Georgia and Azerbaijan. Time is needed for the current political situation (i.e. alliance with the new Russia) to yield tangible positive results and for it to connect sincerely and freely with the masses.
Until then, we require a force that must enforce peaceful co-existence on the peoples of Transcaucasia and, even against their will, to stand as a barricade against Turkey.
This force is, again, Russian.
The Musavatists of Azerbaijan and the Mensheviks of Georgia might not share this opinion – that’s their issue. They might have plans for the future that seem alluring to them, but they fail to inspire me. For example, the division of Armenia among Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia is a political project that may satisfy the Kemalist-Musavatist-Menshevik bloc, but you and I have no reason to applaud such a plan. We have to search for elements within Georgia and Azerbaijan who share our political tendencies – in other words, those elements that tie their future with Russia and not Turkey.
It is necessary to understand and never forget the following: all those powers who are inclined to bring Turkey (under whatever name it may be) into Transcaucasia are enemies to the Armenians of Transcaucasia and the Armenian state.
You say that Russia is Bolshevik and they have turned Armenia into a Bolshevik entity through violence.
You say that the unfamiliar and despotic Bolshevik regime has subjected the population of Armenia to all kinds of hardships – political, civic and economic…You do not trust the Bolsheviks, you dislike their politics and you want to save Armenia from the current and future evils…
But what solution do you have to this?
Is it really Turkey who will come to our assistance in these difficult days of ours?
You say that they are reporting famine, ruin and degradation from Yerevan and Alexandropol…Let’s assume that it is possible that it remains that way. But is it really the fault of the Bolsheviks? And what are they reporting from Kars, Ardahan and Kaghzvan? What is the situation in Ankara? Is it any better?
All idle gossipers are regurgitating the idea that the Bolsheviks are not capable of engaging in work for the sake of prosperity. But who are we comparing them with? You think the Bolsheviks are incompetent, but are the Turkish nationalists competent? When and where have they shown their ability to bring about prosperity?
You attempt to affirm the incompetency of the Soviet government by pointing out that it has just about been able to recover 40-45% of its pre-war productivity levels. Yes, no more, no less. But what has the Turkish nationalist government been able to recover? And what does it even have to recover?
You complain that the Bolshevik Russians are giving too little to Armenia. And what do you think the Turks in Ankara will give if they come to our country tomorrow. What will they bring with them? A strong current? Ready-made products? Tools and machines? Science and craft? Initiative and experience in organising work? Peace and civilisation?
What do you expect from people who have until now shown no other skill apart from going to war?
I have absolutely no expectations from Turkey when it comes to the economy, and even less when it comes to politics.
So why should Armenia prefer Turkey over Russia? Why should it ally with the Turks against Russia or to find ways and make preparations for allying in the future?
You have an argument that seems powerful, decisive and indefeasible to you.
You are saying that the political circumstances can change and align themselves in such a way as to oblige Armenia, even against its will, to get closer to (or, ally itself with) Turkey. For instance, Russia might abandon and distance itself from Transcaucasia (as it did 6-7 years ago) due to internal uprisings to external pressures, leaving us alone with the Turks. The anti-Russian elements in Azerbaijan and Georgia will immediately come to the fore and resume their former romance with Turkey. What will the situation look like for Armenia, you ask, if from today it does not prepare for its new needs and demands. You admit that Russia has the decisive say in Transcaucasia. Let it be so. Perhaps this is better for Armenia…You have a specific opinion regarding this, but you do not want to argue so that you do not complicate the matter. You say that we have the Soviet Armenian government and Armenian communists who are keeping friendly relations with Russia robust. They are completely sufficient for undertaking this role, which they are taking on enthusiastically, which has ensured that we are safe on the northern front. Both the opposite Turkish front remains open. And it is that opening that you want to fill. Let the Armenian Bolsheviks deepen and embed the Russian orientation – you have nothing more to do there. You are taking care of the Turkish orientation and want to work in that direction. You believe that Armenians will be grateful for your wise foresight and patriotism.
This is the key argument that you are bringing forward and on which basis you seek to forming a “new politics”.
Is this extreme naivety or the pastime of an idol person?
You have consistently said, and continue to insist, that your main demand is a United and Independent Armenia and that the Treaty of Lausanne is non-existent for you…
What do you mean when you demand for a “united” Armenia or that the Treaty of Lausanne is, in your eyes, void in its application vis-à-vis Armenia?
It simply means that you demand that the Turks retreat from and give away not only the Armenian or half-Armenian lands in Transcaucasia (Surmalu, Kaghzvan, Kars, Ardahan, Olti), but also the Armenian vilayets of the former, pre-war Turkey (within the borders drawn up by Wilson, or even more than that…).
Do you think that you will manage to speak on good terms with Turks, win them over and ally with them if you bring forth such demands?
Why should the Turks take heed of you, not to mention carry our your demands?
What kind of threat or danger do you represent for the Turks, or what use are you to them for them to agree to your friendship on these terms? Aren’t you afraid that they will mock you as soon as you mumble your demands? Wouldn’t you do the same if you were in their place?
If Turkey managed to snatch Kars from the Russians then why would they hand over such a valuable place to you (in addition to Van and Mush). So that you may be a barrier between Turkey and Russia? But can you or your successors really change the political field again by reorienting yourselves northwards? Or would the Russians themselves, without asking about what you want, one day hit you on the head and take you out of Kars just as the Turks did in 1920? The barrier needs qualities different from the ones that you have or may have. However friendly your relations may be with Turks now and however much they love and trust you, they cannot neglect the fact that the Turkish army keeping guard in Kars is more of a trustworthy force than you and all your friendly relations.
The Turks will give you nothing and they would even be generous if they were to not take everything from you.
***
In order to reach an understanding with the Turks or to take steps in that direction, or even to merely start a conversation, you have to first and foremost give up on a “United” Armenia and any demands for land. You have to be satisfied with the current borders and to add another signature under the treaties signed in Batumi, Alexandropol and Kars.
This is so obvious and indisputable that you want to start the “new politics” of Armenia from that point. You understand the need to change the manner in which we speak. You attempt to mumble new words…
But hesitating and putting forward unclear solutions will not satisfy your future allies. You have to make a clear decision, clarify your position and clearly state that from now on you will decidedly walk hand in hand with the Turks.
Undertaking this volte-face is certainly not an easy feat, especially if friendship with the Turks at this moment in time is in your opinion not so alluring…But in order to save Armenia from the criminal hands of the Bolsheviks and the tyranny of the Russians, you are ready to make this sacrifice.
Very well.
I assume that this is not only what you call “politics” (by the way, this would be considered a “politics” with its back open), but a serious and sincere conviction. In other words, I assume that you, taking into account the current problems and foreseeing the future difficulties, are ready to separate from Russia and link your future to Turkey.
Thus, I assume that the Turks will understand the path you are taking, they will believe in your sincerity and will gladly accept your declarations.
And then?
Is it not true that you cannot satisfy your new allies with your mere statements? They will demand action from you, and rightly so.
As long as the Bolsheviks are in power in Yerevan, Tbilisi and Baku, I am not in a position to initiate anything against them since that would be too dangerous for Armenia. My time will come when you, without my help, can enter Transcaucasia victoriously. That is when I will extend my hand of friendship to you and they will be ready to share this victory with you.
You cannot say this because this would be an open mockery of the Turks and those who cooperate with them. If they are to push the Bolsheviks out and enter Transcaucasia without your participation, then what would they need you for?
The fact is that the Bolsheviks are now in power in Yerevan and the Turks are waiting on the other side of the Akhuryan river. However boastful your statements may be, they will not change the situation. For the Russians to empty Yerevan and for the Turks to pass the Akhuryan river, something else needs to be done.
And that is something that they will demand from you.
You also cannot say that you desire to be helpful but, unfortunately, you do not have the capacity because you are alone and have no power…If you have no power to do something then which idiot would ally with you? On the contrary, for others to ally with you, you need to prove that you are powerful and that all Armenians are on your side, waiting for your command to make a move…
Indeed, they might applaud you, but since political disputes are not solved by mere statements, threats or profanities, they will ask you directly to organise and implement plans.
What plan?
You know that the Bolsheviks are not the type of people to give way to noise and grandiose statements, to meekly yield their authority to you or the Turks. In order to convince them you need to speak in the language of arms…
That is the language in which you need to speak if you are to have any worth in the anti-Bolshevik camp.
Are you ready for that?
***
Have you really been blinded to such an extent that you cannot see where you are going and where destiny will take you once you take that route?
You have continuously asserted that you are ready to support the work geared towards the prosperity of Armenia even if it is under the Bolshevik regime. And you have been upset whenever anyone has doubted your sincerity. But what kind of strange mode of support is this – to keep the country under the constant threat of revolt? What kind of development work can be undertaken in an environment of general insecurity? How can people feel at ease sowing the fields, renovating their houses and roads, clearing out the ditches, drying the marshes, rehabilitating the schools and workshops if they have a fear that it will all be destroyed in the future as a result of internal revolts or Turkish invasion?
And what stance should the Soviet authorities take if it unfortunately takes heed of worthless threats? It will naturally search for the traces of conspiracy and will enthusiastically pursue them using its own specific methods, which are not as real as those of the supposed enemies. In other words, a new reign of terror will resume…
Is this what you want?
Just think a little. Is Armenia in a position to have the right to go through the superfluity of new difficulties and trials?
Is this your patriotism and the support you are giving to the rebuilding process?
You will certainly say, perhaps a little irritated, that you have never even though about causing any difficulties inside or around the country, that your only aim has been to form friendly relations with the Turks and anti-Bolshevik Transcaucasians, so that when the Russians leave our borders and the Turks become the dominant force in the future. In that hypothetical future, Armenia would have a patron, a force that will be able to hold new positions and establish a new political front, in accordance with the new conditions and reliant on new forces…
Do not be so childish and do not give yourself away to self-deception as those listening to you and speaking with you are also child-like.
That hypothetical future will not materialise by itself, it has to be created. You have to be one of those to create that future and you have to start working on it earnestly from today. If you do not do so then you will be considered an impostor or, at the very least, an excessive and unnecessary burden by those who are doing the work.
No “politics” will save you from this cruel necessity. Once you make your choice and have set off on that route, you have to move forward.
By favouring nationalist Turkey over Bolshevik Russia (or Russia in general) and drawing closer to the Kemalist-Musavatist-Georgian-Menshevik alliance, you would not be able to remain loyal to Soviet Armenia, to cosset your friends and at the same time to avoid taking risky steps. You would not be able to do so because you are not Taleryan and those with whom you are dealing are no less politically aware than you.
You have to understand that it is unacceptable to expect to gain something from closer relations with another country when at the present time those relations are inoperable. You have to give something now in order to demand something in return in the future.
Will your expectations for the future ever come to fruition or not? And if they do, when, in what way and in which conditions? You do not know, and so you cannot adapt to such an unclear situation practically. If you are serious about and consistent with your politics then that is your deal, if you are moving forward in that direction, smoothening the way and facilitating the realisation of your politics – in other words, weakening the levers of the Bolshevik authorities in Transcaucasia and, in parallel, strengthening Turkey’s capabilities (because one is inseparably connected to the other).
This is what you have to do starting from today in the context of the current reality and not some hypothetical future.
Are you ready for that? And what how will Armenia respond to you, as you dare to speak on its behalf?
Your political orientation is not some plan concocted by an idle person for fun, but it is a seriously thought out political plan.
Let’s say that your plan receive support from within the country (and even from outside) and it moves into action.
What will the consequences be?
It will in any case inevitably lead to a worrying and nervy situation in the country, an insecure future, fear and doubt, chaos, revolt, and an end to reconstruction work…then more severe state controls, political repression, mass arrests, exile and shootings…then attempts at rebellion, armed clashes, civil conflict, war, mutual massacres, destruction and general misery…
What will all this new suffering be for?
If the attack on the Bolsheviks does not succeed, which is what would most likely happen, the Russians would change the current regime in Transcaucasia, taking into account their experience in the past. They will reduce or completely remove the jurisdiction that the semi-independent states have over themselves, they will strengthen the army and police (at the expense of our country of course), they will replace local officials with Russian ones and perhaps they will go back to the Tsarist policy of settling Russian colonies in border regions.
If this plan does work out then the Russians will be moved out to the other side of the Caucasus mountain range and we will find ourselves stuck between victorious Turkey and Musavatist Azerbaijan, with a nationalist-Menshevik Georgia next to us, who will attempt to appease the Turks in order to guarantee its existence…In other words, we would return to the same state of affairs that we had between 1918-1920 – an unbearable situation in which Armenia felt suffocated and was saved only by the return of the Russians.
So that is what we can expect for the future.
This all has to be accomplished with your support, with your participation, with your own bare hands…
Do you understand what kind of an unparalleled crime this would be against your homeland if your plan were to one day actually be implemented.
If you are really representing one of the sides (as you yourself claim) and if your presence in one or another army can influence the outcome of a hypothetical Russo-Turkish clash, then are you genuinely going to find your place among the Turkish ranks?
I am saying this while accepting your claim that you are a force, that the Armenian people is by your side and is waiting for your signal, ready to go where you tell them to.
I know that those are empty words and that in fact you are not capable of doing anything because nobody will follow your way (especially not this new way that you are taking) and that your orientation is nothing but a futile attempt. I know that whatever you say, you will not go beyond your words. The Turks will not wait for you and will not seek your agreement because they are aware of your capabilities.
There is only one thing you are capable of – to confuse people with your immature ideas (especially those living abroad), to mislead those people who are cut off from their country and are unaware of the current circumstances, to dishearten people, to devalue Soviet Armenia in people’s minds, a Soviet Armenia which is not an illusion, but actually exists, and you would weaken that already weak connection that links the dispersed Armenians to their motherland…
This is what you can do and if this is your wish, then it will not be difficult to achieve this in the current climate.
You will simply end up sowing the seeds of despair and abandonment in the communities abroad that are already demoralised.
If Armenians living abroad are told about what monsters the Bolsheviks are and how treacherous the Armenian Bolsheviks are, about the hell that Soviet Armenia is being turned into, then those Armenians will come to the conclusion that the Russian Bolsheviks, led by the Armenian traitors, have come and smothered our new state and that the only way to free ourselves from the Russian tyranny is to embrace Turkey. Woe to anybody who is of this conviction…
This is their conviction because for Armenia there is no question of a Turkish orientation and there cannot be such a question – it is politically a joke, the absurdity of which only you cannot see in your blindness. For Armenia there is only the question of “surrendering” to the Turks…Indeed this extreme misfortune is not an impossible outcome, and so corresponding actions are necessary. But that is not a political orientation, but a coercion into abandoning all demands. Do you not think that that role does not belong to you and that there is clearly no need to make any preparations for “raising your hands” [in defeat] – you can do that as much as you want and when you want.
Armenia’s only orientation points towards Russia. Armenia can only live by being tied to Russia. It has no other option politically. This mind-set needs to be embedded in the minds of Armenians. Any attempt to change this orientation in people’s minds is harmful because it will create a fissure within our collective will – it will immobilise or weaken our ability to carry out work.
Russia is now Bolshevik and so the only possible kind of Armenia at this time is a Soviet Armenia.
This is our present and this is our hope for the future. This is the idea around which the Armenian nation has to gather all its forces. This has to be the object of our love and compassion, and especially our object of work. It is the first and greatest responsibility of every patriotic Armenian to strengthen Armenia in any way and not to ally with those who are conspiring against Armenia.
To drown the Soviet authorities is equivalent, at least in the current circumstances, to drowning Armenia as well. Any attempt in that direction is a form of treachery against Armenia.
It would be extremely foolish or criminally false to desire the fall of Bolshevik Armenia in order to create an Armenian Armenia, to desire liberation from the Russian yolk in order to secure the free and independent existence of Armenia under the patronage of the Turks…
I would be so glad if you tell me that I have misunderstood you or subject you to slander.
August, 1924
