WikiLeaks-Armenia No 83
2008-07-11
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 YEREVAN 000564
SUBJECT: FM NALBANDIAN PREVIEWS ISSUES FOR WASHINGTON VISIT
Classified By: CDA Joseph Pennington, reasons 1.4 (b,d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: CDA called on FM Eduard Nalbandian July 10 at the FM’s request to compare issues to be raised during Nalbandian’s July 17 meeting with Secretary Rice and other high-level meetings in Washington that week. Nalbandian fenced with CDA in classic Soviet style on Armenia’s democracy problems, and was surprisingly curmudgeonly even on the Turkey and Nagorno-Karabakh issues on which Armenia looks relatively constructive at the moment. Nalbandian closed, however, with an extended riff on his sincere desire to raise U.S.-Armenian relations to a higher level. Nalbandian’s determination to speak in English despite his relative lack of facility with it (English is his fifth language) seemed something of a barrier, as we have had better meetings with him in Armenian and Russian. END SUMMARY
¶2. (U) TRIP PLANNING: CDA and polchief met FM Nalbandian and MFA Americas Director Armen Yeganian to compare notes on the issues each side might wish to raise during his Washington visit. In addition to Secretary Rice, Nalbandian is slated to meet DNSA Jeffries, EUR A/S Fried and DAS Bryza, MCC CEO Danilovich, and is seeking to confirm several meetings on the Hill. He will also speak at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Nalbandian started by soliciting CDA’s input.
¶3. (C) DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: CDA started with the democratic reform agenda, noting that nothing the Secretary raises should be surprising to Nalbandian. CDA also noted that the July 3 meeting with President Sargsian (reftel) had been very constructive and much appreciated. CDA commented that the Secretary would want to review the same issues which had figured in DRL A/S Kramer’s recent visit. He emphasized the problem of political prisoners as the most pressing of several significant concerns on the democracy agenda. He observed that, as an example, the case of former Armenian foreign minister Alexander Arzumanian, looked very troublesome. (NOTE: Arzumanian served as campaign chairman for former President and opposition leader Levon Ter-Petrossian’s 2008 campaign. He is now being held in jail on highly questionable charges of “usurpation of state power” (with possible sentence of 10-15 years imprisonment) and “provoking mass disorder” (6-12 years). END NOTE) Nalbandian seized on CDA’s offhand remark that Arzumanian’s wife is an American citizen to complain at length that no one’s spouse’s citizenship could make them above the law, and to argue that Arzumanian was a deceitful manipulator, who hid behind false human rights claims. CDA commented that Arzumanian is only one of a number of prominent opposition political figures being held on highly questionable charges, for which no clear evidence had been revealed. Nalbandian continued circling ad nauseum around his uncompelling theme of Arzumanian’s alleged “political manipulation” under the guise of “human rights.” At one point, Nalbandian said he had had a hand in persuading then-President Kocharian to free Arzumanian from jail in 2007 (when Arzumanian was held on questionable charges of money laundering), having pointed out that the case made Armenia look bad. However, Nalbandian hinted that Arzumanian was guilty of many unspecified crimes. CDA pointed out that the repeatedly extended pre-trial detention of Arzumanian, and other senior opposition politicians, without any hint of progress to the alleged investigations, created the appearance of just locking up political rivals.
¶4. (C) POSITIVES AND NEGATIVES: CDA noted that we have reported some positive political developments to Washington as well, such as early successes in the new administration’s campaigns to reform the tax and customs authorities, replace some problematic senior officials with more highly regarded faces, and combat corruption. He mentioned that such moves improved the government’s image and credibility with its own public. Nalbandian agreed. CDA commended the fact that government-controlled media have done better over the last few months in airing opposition political figures and viewpoints, though this had not yet been matched by structural change to eliminate the government’s dominance of the media sector. CDA called for restoring the television license for the pro-oppositional A1 Plus television network, particularly in light of the recent European Court for Human Rights ruling that Armenian authorities had improperly revoked the license in 2002.
¶5. (C) TALKING TURKEY: CDA praised President Sargsian’s initiative to invite Turkish President Gul to Armenia for the World Cup match, and his other overtures to Turkey. He also spoke favorably of the president’s constructive approach to Nagorno Karabakh negotiations. Nalbandian commented that Armenia is ready to “turn the page” and normalize its Turkey relationship, but grumped that Ankara must be in that mood as well. He emphasized that Armenia is ready to move forward promptly, and expressed disappointment that FM Babacan was not willing to meet sooner than UN GA. Nalbandian commented that as neighbors, it should be easy for the two FMs to meet at any time. He opined that the U.S. should push the Turkish side harder. CDA said Embassy Ankara had told us President Sargsian’s invitation had been received positively by Turkish officials, but that the political currents swirling in Ankara right now may mean the GOT [Government of Turkey] will not be able to respond to the invitation until closer to the September event. CDA said that “the goal is to get to ‘yes’ but it might take a bit of time. Nalbandian harrumphed that he could hardly see how that Turkish side could say no to the invitation. CDA praised President Sargsian’s op-ed statement in the Wall Street Journal Europe calling for a new relationship with Turkey, and hailed the piece as a constructive gesture from Sargsian. Nalbandian grumbled that, of course, the president cannot be expected to make such statements every day — a non sequitor, as no such suggestion had been made. CDA replied that with President Sargsian’s recent gestures Armenia had done its part to open a good faith dialogue, and the next step should be with Turkey to respond.
¶6. (C) NAGORNO KARABAKH: Nalbandian affirmed the NK issue as “very important” to Armenia. He said the two presidents’ meeting in St. Petersburg had showed “some positive signs,” but following that meeting, the Azerbaijanis had showed themselves not to be in any hurry. He said that the Minsk Group Co-Chairs had wanted promptly to schedule a Foreign Ministers’ meeting, and that he had been ready to meet right away, but Mammadyarov had been unavailable on any of the dates proposed over the next three months. Mammadyarov had eventually proposed meeting on the margins of the UNGA, Nalbandian claimed, which he felt showed a lack of seriousness from the Azerbaijani side. He pointed out that the Azerbaijani election is in October, so postponing any meeting until late September at the UN GA in effect means postponing any real progress until after that election. Nalbandian also reiterated President Sargsian’s complaints (reftel) about Baku officials’ January remarks about the negotiating process and Madrid document, which he called destructive. He stressed that he is ready to meet anywhere, any time, to advance the negotiations.
¶7. (C) NEW U.S. AMBASSADOR: Nalbandian mentioned that he looks forward to having a new ambassador confirmed, and recalled that he had made statements in support of the need for a confirmed ambassador. He said he would make similar statements during his Washington meetings, including on the Hill. CDA said that it would be good for Senators to hear the Armenian government’s perspective on the desirability of getting an ambassador at post.
¶8. (C) OTHER BUSINESS: CDA mentioned our disappointment with a recent “Golos Armenii” (“Voice of Armenia”) editorial which again accused the United States of fomenting revolution in Armenia, this time through the mechanism of the USAID anti-corruption project. This was especially disappointing since this newspaper was considered close not only to the government but specifically to President Sargsian, and we would be concerned if this were a bellwether. Missing the latter point, Nalbandian launched into a general lament of the low quality of newspapers in Armenia, but said he would speak to the Golos Armenii editor. CDA also mentioned the Prosecutor General’s recent oddball remark — renewing a message he had used some months ago — that Levon Ter-Petrossian and his team had “hypnotized” the crowds into supporting him, using “neuro-linguistic techniques.” CDA commented that this theory is seen in the West as just nutty, and raises questions as to the legal reasoning that Armenia’s top law enforcement officer was bringing to the pending court cases against Ter-Petrossian supporters. Nalbandian put this down to a “poetic mood” on the part of the Prosecutor General. More generally, Nalbandian closed by emphasizing his desire to boost the level of U.S.-Armenian relations, and especially to improve the public perception of the United States in Armenia. CDA and the FM agreed to think more about ways to do this in the future.
9. (C) COMMENT — PROTESTING TOO MUCH: The most striking thing about this meeting was the surprisingly sour tone Nalbandian evinced, even on subjects on which Armenia has a good story to tell. Most notably on Turkey, Nalbandian ought to be happily taking credit for the new Sargsian overtures, and projecting success. Instead, he seemed grudging and pessimistic about the prospect for his own government’s strategy. He was the same on Azerbaijan. In both cases, he seemed eager to blame the other side even before it has become clear that there is some fault to criticize. His apologias for Armenia’s democratic performance were similarly defensive and unenlightened. One reason, perhaps, was that Nalbandian seemed often to have to focus too much attention on constructing his English sentences at the expense of content. It might have been a somewhat better meeting in Russian or Armenian. Whatever the reason, Nalbandian’s responses were alternately defensive and overly pessimistic on the key issues of importance to the United States. That said, we do not yet have the sense that Nalbandian is a real player on the issue of Turkish-Armenian relations. It seems that Deputy FM Kirakossian is reporting directly to the president on this matter, so Nalbandian’s gloomy outlook may not be determinative of Armenian policy decisions.
PENNINGTON
