Russia’s Defense Minister Pavel Grachov invited his Armenian and Azerbaijani counterparts, Serge Sargsyan and Mamedrafi Mamedov, to Moscow on February 18, 1994. A protocol was signed envisaging a halt to military operations on March 1. Later Mamedov explained, “The subject of the negotiations was the Armenian withdrawal from six regions, except for Shushi and Lachin. According to the document, the Armenians were to release Aghdam and Fizuli within a month and then, within three months, another four regions. The subject of the negotiations between the sides remained Shushi, Lachin and NK’s status. For reasons unknown to me that project was not implemented.”
In the military field, an exhausted Azerbaijan was exerting its last efforts with the hopes of regaining something on the ground. That was the reason why, at the end of January, Baku once again rejected Russia’s next suggestion to stop the firing. On March 9, Kozirev urged Ter-Petrosyan and Kocharyan to return one of the regions occupied in the autumn of 1993 to Azerbaijan. On April 15, during the CIS summit in Moscow, where Ter-Petrosyan and Aliyev were also present, a ceasefire announcement was approved.
Battles continued with some breaks until the end of April. The NK forces began a counter-attack towards Mir Bashir (present-day Terter) and Aghdam-Barda, liberating several Armenian villages that had been occupied earlier. From mid-April on, battles resumed in the northeastern sector of Martakert. Opposing calls from Yerevan to cease the advance, the NK side initiated operations to take Mir Bashir and its adjacent territories. At the end of April about 50 thousand residents from the Mir Bashir region and its adjacent territories abandoned the villages and found shelter in Barda and Yevlakh. The Azerbaijani side was waiting for a new extensive assault, but the command was given to stop the attack.
Nelson Soghomonyan, one of the commanders of the Martuni front, recalls that during the last days of the war Samvel Babayan visited the front line every day, raised issues on the spot, redistributed the forces and appealed for urgency. “Probably Babayan knew that the war was going to be stopped. If military actions had not been halted, we were going to enter Mir Bashir, within a maximum of three days, if not in one.”
When referring to the May ceasefire, Vladimir Kazimirov even today recalls Babayan with laughter. “I remember his arrogant announcement. He even blamed us, the mediators, the Russian mediator, that by putting an end to the military actions we hindered him in coming out at … Baku.”
Victory day
In December 1993, Meditkhan Sherimkulov, Speaker of the Parliament of Kyrgyzstan, also acting as the Chairman of the CIS Inter-Parliamentary Assembly, participated in the NK settlement seminar/meeting on the Aland Islands. A peacemaking group for the NK conflict was created during the session. Sherimkulov suggested holding a next meeting and continuing the dialogue between the two sides in Bishkek. Before that, at the end of March and in the first days of April, Sherimkulov’s peacemaking group visited Baku, Yerevan and Stepanakert.
From May 4 to 5, the leaders of the parliaments, in addition to Guliyev, gathered in Bishkek. President Aliyev had left for Brussels and on May 4, at NATO’s headquarters, he signed the document to join the “Partnership for Peace” program. Guliyev remained in Baku in order to manage Azerbaijan until Aliyev’s return.
“That is why Azerbaijan sent Deputy Chairman of Parliament Afiaddin Jalilov. In Moscow, before leaving for Bishkek, I had set out in writing the draft Bishkek Protocol. The main point of the Protocol was the call for a cease-fire. It was important that the parliament speakers endorse the cessation of fighting. The night of May 9 was selected by mutual agreement beforehand, since we hoped that it would be associated with the Victory Day for all the peoples of the Soviet Union. We hoped to show that common sense prevailed in the NK conflict,” Kazimirov recalled.
Armenia, Nagorno Karabakh, Russia, Kyrgyzstan and representatives of the CIS and Russia’s Foreign Affairs Ministry signed the document. The Deputy Chairman of Azerbaijan’s Parliament refused to do so.
Kazimirov recounts: “Everyone except for Jalilov signed the protocol in Bishkek. He explained that he could not sign it since we hadn’t permitted Nizami Bahmanov, head of the Azerbaijani community of NK, to sign it. In fact, a few days later on May 21, Haydar Aliyev revealed in Baku why Jalilov didn’t sign the protocol. Aliyev said that he had instructed him not to sign any document without his approval. On May 4-5, 1994, Aliyev was in Brussels and we were in Bishkek. I called Guliyev from Bishkek and tried in vain to persuade him to empower his deputy, Djalilov, to sign the document. The others, with the exception of Azerbaijan, signed it. We agreed that if Azerbaijani parliamentarians so decided, they could join the Bishkek Protocol later on. That is why after coordinating with Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozirev I had to rush to Baku to discuss the Bishkek Protocol with Heydar Aliyev and Rasul Guliyev. I went to Azerbaijan on May 7.”
On May 5, Aliyev returned from Brussels to Baku, making a stop in Turkey on the way. On May 8, Kazimirov’s meeting with Azerbaijan’s president began. Guliyev, Jalilov, Foreign Affairs Minister Hasanov, Defense Minister Mamedov and Azerbaijan’s Ambassador to Russia, Rzaev, were seated next to Aliyev.
“I was representing the mediators alone. Aliyev immediately rushed to the attack saying that we had again drafted a document disregarding the interests of Azerbaijan. I said that the Armenians didn’t like everything in the text either. I said, ‘Find just one formulation that neglects the interests of the Azerbaijani people.’ I was alone. The others, naturally, defended their boss. Finally, Rzaev made the first sober comment; that the bloodshed must be stopped. He had close personal relations with Guliyev. So Guliyev supported his friend Rzaev, and here came the turning point. I told them that the document was not legal but political. They added the word ‘international’ before the word ‘observers’ in the text, though, if they meant the Russians, they too were international. Quite a meaningless amendment. The second amendment was to replace the term ‘held territories’ with ‘occupied territories’. The last and the most comical one, was that they again began insisting on putting Bahmanov’s signature on the document as well. As before, in Bishkek, I asked what institution Bahmanov represented; was it a legislature? We argued for long time, but they insisted on both amendments and wound up adding Bahmanov’s name under the Protocol”, recalls Kazimirov with a smile.
However, they could not find Bahmanov in Baku for him to sign as well. However, the signature of another, Jalilov or Guliyev, was important for Azerbaijan to agree to the document.
“Aliyev said, ‘Affiyaddin, sign it.’ But Jalilov suddenly replied that he could not sign the document since he had publicly stated his position. And I thought, ‘Oh, damn! Why do we need Jalilov’s signature when Guliyev is present here?’ Perhaps Guliyev-Jalilov relations were tense. Guliyev said that for some people their prestige was more important, but that for him it didn’t matter much; what was important were the interests of his people. I’m simplifying it now, but that was the gist. And Aliyev told Guliyev to sign. I took the paper and called Yerevan and Stepanakert”, recalls the Russian mediator.
On May 9, Victory Day, Kazimirov was drafting another ceasefire document in his hotel room in Baku and coordinating the details with Yerevan and Stepanakert. On the same day, Mamedov signed the document in Aliyev’s private office. The Russian mediator denied Guluzade’s assertions that the document was signed by Yerevan and Baku, and that NK’s signature was added secretly by Kazimirov.
“I still have in my archive the very first draft without Yerevan’s name; only the names of Mamedov and Babayan are inscribed on it for signature. Later on, Aliyev said that it would be better to add Yerevan’s signature, which was in line with our intentions. I had been telling Ter-Petrosyan and the other Armenians for months that there was no need to hide behind NK’s back. ‘You are a full-fledged party to the conflict and it is necessary to participate in these proceedings directly,’” says Kazimirov.
Aliyev agreed and so did Ter-Petrosyan. But Baku refused to sign the paper with Nagorno Karabakh. For that reason the Russians didn’t want to waste valuable time on organizing a trilateral meeting.
Kazimirov continues: “We employed an unusual, semi-diplomatic trick. Each one of the parties signed the paper separately, without the presence of the other parties. Since 1993, when short term cease-fire arrangements were signed, we had the experience of ‘fax diplomacy’. This arose because of the urgency of the matter and the impossibility of gathering the parties around a table, giving the Russian mediator no other choice but to agree upon matters over the phone and to quickly commit them to paper using fax-machines. The first cease-fire agreement bore only Mamedov’s signature; the other signatories’ names and positions were inscribed in the document. I took this signature and left for Moscow. I asked Serge Sargsyan to send the agreement with his signature to Moscow via fax. Then Samvel Babayan sent his signature. I had in my hands all three papers and therefore the cease-fire agreement. There are three different papers containing one signature each with two other names and positions inscribed on them without signatures. They didn’t want to sign the paper together. Of course, it was an unusual method. I consistently struggle with the OSCE because they label the agreement ‘non-official’ in their annual reports. I ask – ‘What is non-official about this?’ True, there is no single joint paper but it doesn’t mean the agreement is unofficial.”
On May 9, the Defense Minister of Azerbaijan addressed a letter to Russia’s Defense and Foreign Affairs Ministers, as well as to Kazimirov, announcing the willingness of the conflicting sides to cease firing in the early hours of May 11, 1994. On the next day the Defense Minister of Armenia did the same, followed by the Commander of NK’s Defense Forces on May 11.
Recalling the May ceasefire, Mamedov has said, “We were carrying out military actions; we stopped and went on the defense. The opponent decided that we were powerless to attack and could start a counter-attack. In order to avoid that, it was necessary to reach a ceasefire agreement.”
On February 23, 2001, during his speech in parliament, Aliyev referred to the incidents of seven years before. “I am again stating that the cease-fire achieved in May 1994 was a very important measure and we did this with full conscience. Although the problem has not been solved, yet the cease-fire was necessary. Unfortunately, many have forgotten the war; they are living quietly and comfortably. Unfortunately, they have forgotten the war.”
Did Baku sign the agreement out of a sense of overall exhaustion on both sides, or out of fear of losing further regions?
“One didn’t contradict the other. One wouldn’t have happened without the other. Our efforts would have yielded no results if Aliyev’s situation hadn’t been critical. Essentially, Aliyev faced losing not only other territories but his power as well. It is often said in Baku that Kazimirov threatened that the Armenians would take Gyanja. Why did I threaten? Stubborn fighting was going on in the Terter region. That is, ahead lay Barda, Yevlakh, Mingechaur, and the repetition of the southwest scenario. There [in the southwest] the Armenians reached the Arax River; in this case, relatively speaking, they would have reached the Kur River. Just imagine Aliyev’s position if the northwest of Azerbaijan had been ‘cut off’. Accordingly, signing the cease-fire agreement wasn’t a matter of goodwill but a struggle for survival,” says Kazimirov.
Samvel Babayan does not agree. “We were ready to continue the war; it was not an issue of exhaustion. Azerbaijan had to accept those terms that would end the war. From the experience in 1993 we knew that after each of our successes Azerbaijan agreed to all conditions, only in order to reenergize. It was apparent to us that we had to move in the Mir Bashir and Barda directions and put Azerbaijan in a situation where he had to sign the peace agreement, and accept and delineate Karabakh’s territory; instead of merely taking a formal ‘time-out’ If we had advanced the 5-6 kilometers remaining to Mir Bashir, today we would have Karabakh’s territory set down on paper. At that time I knew that Baku would agree to recognize NK only in a deadlock.”
The ceasefire was put into force on May 12. On May 16-17, a meeting between Serge Sargsyan, Mamedrafi Mamedov and Samvel Babayan took place in Moscow, during which the “protocol on the method to implement the February 18, 1994 protocol” was discussed. An agreement was signed to stop the shooting on May 17 at midnight sharp. A document was prepared which envisaged the separation of the NK and Azerbaijani armies, creating a buffer zone between the sides and allocating peacekeeping forces. Grachov, Sargsyan and Babayan signed the document. Mamedov did not sign the document. He was called back to Baku immediately. Azerbaijan refused to sign the summarizing protocol of the Moscow agreement, but the ceasefire became a reality.
Years later Aliyev said, “Russia was the major mediator, although there was the Minsk Group as well. But Russia took the initiative. A cease-fire agreement was signed and immediately after, the Russian Defense Minister asked the Armenian and Azerbaijani defense ministers to come to Moscow and discuss how to liberate the lands seized. We believed him. We sent Mamedov there. What happened the next day? Out of the blue, I was informed that Moscow TV was showing Grachov holding an extended session and suggesting what should be done in Azerbaijan. I immediately got worried. I contacted our defense minister. It turns out that talks were being held there with Rasul Guliyev’s consent, and in the presence of our ambassador in Moscow, on sending Russian peacekeeping troops to the region to ensure the ceasefire.”
Vladimir Kazimirov recalls an interesting scene from this meeting in Moscow. “During the meeting, which had been organized at Grachov’s initiation, the employees of the defense ministry, probably familiar with past ceasefire agreements failures, had prepared a document draft proposing the cessation of gunfire as of May 18. That’s to say, five days after the official ceasefire had already been put into effect.”
Truly, it was hard to believe that a ceasefire had finally been established and the bloodshed was finally being stopped.
On one occasion, more than ten years later, Kazimirov said that if the ceasefire somehow transformed into a peace treaty, he would get up and dance.
From Tatul Hakobyan’s book – KARABAKH DIARY; GREEN and BLACK
