WikiLeaks-Armenia No 67
2008-02-27
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 YEREVAN 000163
Classified By: CDA Joseph Pennington, reasons 1.4 (b,d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: CDA and polchief met with two of the PM’s closest advisers over drinks late February 26 to compare notes. PM staff probed for our political assessment. We expressed concerns over arrests of opposition politicians, voting infractions we had seen, the conduct of the recounts, and other flaws — pointing out that these problems lent credibility to Levon Ter-Petrossian’s (LTP) position and undermined public trust in the outcome. We said that a heavy-handed intervention to clear Freedom Square would be another serious blow to the PM’s image. The PM staffers mounted tepid defenses on one or two points, but quickly backtracked to a second line of defense: these things were happening outside of the PM’s control and against his interests. They portrayed a stubborn President Kocharian, determined to impose order, and misguided oligarchs/thugs, whom Sargsian was not yet strong enough to face down. They pleaded for stronger U.S. support for the PM’s position and legitimacy, which would strengthen Sargsian’s hand in getting those other forces to behave properly. We replied that it cannot work that way; it is the GOAM’s [Government of Armenia] responsibility to manage its democratic processes cleanly, and the USG [U. S. Government] would not give a free pass as a means to an end. END SUMMARY
¶2. (C) SO…WHAT DO YOU GUYS REALLY THINK?: The prime minister’s senior aide (and son-in-law) Mikhail “Misha” Minasyan, and staff adviser Levon Martirosyan requested a casual meeting with CDA and polchief over drinks at a cafe Minasyan owns. The cordial conversation lasted over two hours, with lots of give and take all around. Both sides repeatedly invoked the informal nature of the meeting as an opportunity to “speak frankly” and say things neither side would be prepared to say more officially. It was clear to us that this was the PM’s way of getting a reading on our reactions to the election and post-election scene, as well as lobby for a U.S. Presidential congratulations message. The two men seemed genuinely ready to listen as well as talk, and implicitly conceded the truth of many of our criticisms. We framed most of these problems as either issues that harmed PM Sargsian’s image and reputation or as elements that gave credibility to LTP’s protests, and said it was imperative for the government to get itself on the right side of these democratic legitimacy points in order to alleviate public mistrust and reduce tension. We emphasized our belief that PM Sargsian won more votes than any other candidate on February 19, and we looked forward to working with him as president on numerous fronts once the immediate crisis has been weathered. We urged the government to put a stop to “red flag” indicators such as arresting opposition politicians, and use great care not to drive the protesters violently out of Freedom Square.
¶3. (C) THE AIRING OF GRIEVANCES: Over the course of the two hours, we were able to work a number of specific criticisms into our conversation. We mentioned voter intimidation (highlighting the notorious oligarch “La Fik Samo” and his election day goon squads in Yerevan’s Malatia district as a specific example). We related having seen minibus-loads of voters gathered at a local market to receive improperly issued absentee voting permits from party organizers and subsequently dispatched to polling stations. We noted that a USG observer had seen blatant vote-count fraud, also in Malatia. Moreover, the flawed recount process had also been a lost opportunity to win public confidence. Polchief commented that while he felt very confident Sargsian won a plurality of votes cast on February 19, he could not be nearly so confident that the PM legitimately won a first-round majority, given the narrow margin of victory and the problems we knew about. We spoke about the unfair media and the seeming information black-out on television about the LTP rallies, which we noted only increased public interest in what was going on at Freedom Square. We commented that Sargsian may have won on February 19, but he was losing the battle for public opinion since then. We repeatedly pointed out that rounding up opposition politicians, searching their offices, and throwing them in jail was extremely unhelpful to the PM’s case for legitimacy. We noted that any kind of bloody confrontation on Freedom Square between police and protesters would also be a huge negative. Better to let the protest drag on and wither away on its own than to provoke a confrontation that could create martyrs or images of victims for world media to broadcast. We praised the restraint and professionalism shown by police so far in avoiding conflict with the demonstrators. Minasyan replied that every morning PM Sargsian called each of the relevant police chiefs and told them “if there’s any problem, I hold you personally responsible, and I won’t care who started what.” We also foreshadowed, non-specifically, that the next ODIHR report is likely to be more negative than the last statement.
¶4. (C) THE PM’S SIDE OF THE STORY: The PM’s aides fenced with us a little bit on certain points — for example, not conceding the recount had been troubled. Minasyan pointed out (accurately) that we kept mentioning just a few problematic districts — such as Malatia, Abovian, Erebuni, Davitashen — as the scene of problems, and that taken all together there are not enough votes to change the first-round outcome. We acknowledged the point, while noting that that assumes everything was perfect across the rest of the country, and that we ignore reports of vote-buying, intimidation, unfair media access, and abuse of public administrative resources. Minasyan said that LTP is a professional revolutionary — having played a big role in bringing down the Soviet Union. As such, LTP has no incentive to make reasonable concessions, but will continue to be hard line. He said that LTP and his core following have become increasingly radicalized and are not amenable to reasonable compromise. We conceded that could be true, and pointed out that that the goal must be to win over the thousands of ordinary citizens who have joined LTP. The two advisers highlighted the message of inclusive outreach that was a theme of the PM’s rally remarks, and pointed out that the PM was negotiating with several other parties — he mentioned the Dashnaks and Orinats Yerkir — which he hoped would join in a grand coalition government. Minasyan said he agreed with us on a number of points about the appearance problems. Minasyan was sure that sooner of later LTP would stage a provocation — such as a protester getting killed in the square — which he could use as a spark to whip up public outrage. The longer things continue as they are, and specifically the longer the USG waits to congratulate, the more certain it becomes that other things will go wrong and make the situation worse.
¶5. (C) BATTLE FOR ARMENIA’S SOUL?: By the end, the key theme was that the PM had done everything within his own power to promote a fair and transparent election and post-election process. However, Kocharian is “a strong president” and still in charge, and there is a limit to how much influence Sargsian can have over him. Similarly, many of the problems we noted in the districts surrounding Yerevan were the handiwork of powerful oligarchs, who retained substantial independent power bases and still suffered from an old-think mentality that on election day what they should do is go out and make things happen their way. This is partly a misguided desire to be helpful to the PM, and partly just their own egotistical need to play the local big shot and remind everyone who’s really boss of the neighborhood. Minasyan said that once in office, Sargsian hopes to impose proper rule of law and end the impunity of such people. However, this will be much harder for him to do if he must rely on such men’s support during the current political turmoil. The best way to end the impunity and abuses is for the West to come out firmly in support of Sargsian now, so he will be empowered later. Minasyan pointed out his colleague, Levon Martirosyan, as an example of the young generation of educated, Western-thinking people who are on the rise within the ruling party. Who would we rather have Sargsian indebted to, he implied, the old robber barons or this younger generation?
¶6. (C) GEORGIA, GEORGIA, GEORGIA!: Minasyan and Martirosyan also raised by-now-familiar comparisons to Georgia’s January election, expressing the view that Armenia’s election had been at least as good as Georgia’s, but they felt that the USG was taking a more skeptical stance on Armenia. We replied that we ourselves are not experts on what happened in Georgia, our mandate is to focus and report to Washington on Armenia.
¶7. (C) THE OTHER SHOE DROPS: On February 27, CDA received a summons to see President Kocharian, who was by now familiar with many of the election-related criticisms that we had mentioned to the PM’s staffers. Kocharian pushed back more insistently on the facts, arguing that — two isolated cases aside — nothing wrong had taken place anywhere. Septel will report that conversation fully.
¶8. (C) COMMENT: The Minasyan/Martirosyan conversation, with its casual “we’re all just friends talking” format, was highly useful to both sides. We were able to let down some — certainly not all — of the pretense and shadowboxing inherent in our respective roles, and really understand where the other was coming from. We appreciated the chance to give a wider overview of the variety and scope of election violations that we have learned about, and we got relatively little pushback on what actually went wrong. It seemed that Minasyan, especially, was thoughtfully taking on board much of what we had to say. Equally important, we think we were successful in assuring the PM’s staffers that we are not trying to undermine the president-elect, that we look forward to working with Sargsian, and we should help each other by doing everything possible to identify and clean up the problems related to the election so that Sargsian will emerge a more legitimate president.
PENNINGTON
