WikiLeaks-Armenia No 70
2007-10-16
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 YEREVAN 001241
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR PM SERZH SARGSIAN’S WASHINGTON VISIT
Classified By: CDA R.V. Perina, reasons 1.4 (b,d)
SUMMARY
¶1. (C) Prime Minister Serzh Sargsian’s visit to Washington October 17-23 is his chance to see and be seen with Washington leaders in the run-up to his February 2008 presidential election bid. With his extensive defense and security background, Sargsian now needs to show himself as a world leader. He is still feeling his way on economic and social policy issues, but is eager to embrace his expanded role. Many observers are tempted into the easy cynicism that presumes Sargsian will be a “more of the same” president: shadowing Russian precedents on democratic (non)reforms, and offering little room for real change to take root. We believe such assumptions are premature. Sargsian’s words to date have offered hope that he may be more flexible, reform-minded, and even visionary than President Kocharian, especially on key issues such as Turkish relations and getting to an NK settlement. He is also smart enough to handle the current AGR [Armenian Genocide Recognition] debate in Washington with discretion and not embarrass any of his interlocutors with this issue.
END SUMMARY
SARGSIAN’S DEBUTANTE BALL
¶2. (C) Prime Minister Sargsian’s visit to Washington (and his stop in Paris immediately thereafter) represent his “coming-out party” on the world stage. The transition time between the May 2007 parliamentary and February 2008 presidential elections represent both an apprenticeship and audition period for Sargsian, as he uses the prime ministership both to learn the ropes of the civilian side of government and to campaign for the presidency. Before acceding to the prime ministership in April 2007 (some weeks earlier than expected, after PM Markarian died March 25), Sargsian’s experience was almost entirely in the security ministries. We are pleased with Sargsian’s attentive engagement with the Millennium Challenge program since he took over as prime minister and ex officio chair of the MCA-Armenia governing council. He has also worked hard to get around to Armenia’s various regions. As defense minister, after deciding to intensify Armenia’s NATO relationship, Sargsian accelerated the IPAP reforms, satisfying NATO officials with Armenia’s rapid progress over the last three years.
¶3. (C) Sargsian is not a deeply popular figure in Armenia, nor is he a natural politician. He comes across to many voters as colorless. His election to the presidency is widely seen as inevitable, but like many “inevitable” candidates in elections, his chief asset is the perception that he is unstoppable. The lack of competitve opposition alternatives bolsters this point. His support is based more on the self-interest of Armenia’s political and economic elites than on much of anyone’s abiding loyalty to him personally. Sargsian’s behavior seems aimed at shoring up as much potential support for his presidential bid as possible. His control of the powerful Republican Party political machine, with its extensive party cadres, infrastructure and deep pockets, seems firm. Sargsian can best sell the electorate on his candidacy with his defense credentials (in a country where many feel surrounded by hostile neighbors), and on his ability to continue the positive economic trends of the past seven years.
MAKING THE PITCH ON ELECTIONS AND GOOD GOVERNANCE
¶4. (C) Sargsian says all the right things to us about his desire to improve Armenia’s performance on meeting international election standards, tackling corruption, and making sure Armenia makes the grade on MCC indicators. U.S. interlocutors should reinforce our strong interest that the presidential election be even better than the May 2007 parliamentary election. The latter was a step forward from Armenia’s past appalling election performance, but still troublingly opaque. The process of vote tabulation and reporting was not nearly as transparent as it should have been. We should also make a strong pitch to Sargsian that his own legitimacy will be at stake in February. Sargsian and the ruling party are convinced (accurately) that no matter how well the elections are conducted, the opposition will loudly proclaim fraud and seek to rally voters into the streets in protest.
¶5. (C) MAKE THE OBSERVATION MISSION YOUR FRIEND: Our argument is that the best source of legitimacy is a robust OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission able to corroborate Sargsian’s victory. However, during this past May’s election, the government tightly restricted the number of accredited U.S. Embassy election observers, and put pressure on the OSCE/ODIHR mission, apparently trying to prevent any negative news from being reported. We believe President Kocharian was behind the rather paranoid tone the GOAM [Government of Armenia] set with the ODIHR observers, but we hope Sargsian will understand that his self-interest lies in winning the OSCE’s good opinion, and that he can help set a different tone with the observers for the February election.
¶6. (C) KEEPING THE PEACE: We are troubled by how many opposition politicians seem focused more on post-election rallies with which they hope to force the government to resign than they are on the election itself. Ruling party figures have also mentioned this worry. We should make the point that law-abiding, peaceful demonstrations are a normal part of a democracy, and the government must be careful to manage these situations with restraint. Any use of disproportionate force to disperse protesters would be a serious black eye for Armenia.
¶7. (C) WHITHER THE MCC INDICATORS: MCC officials should offer Sargsian and his team frank briefings on the implications of the fact that Armenia has just graduated to a higher national income bracket (GDP per capita), where the competition and standards are stiffer. This will put many of its MCC indicators into the red. Armenia had all too little room for error even in the previous category, as “Ruling Justly” indicators already skated on thin ice. Senior State officials can usefully renew the point that the presidential election in February will be another key benchmark for MCC eligibility.
MOVING TOWARD RECONCILIATION WITH TURKEY
¶8. (C) Encouraging Yerevan and Ankara toward reconciliation is often fraught with frustration, as both sides often seem all too anxious to back away. Armenian leaders remain profoundly unconvinced of Turkish good faith, though Sargsian has in recent months given us encouraging words about his sincere desire to achieve normal relations with Turkey. If we believe that the current mood in Ankara offers real possibility of advancing Armenian-Turkish relations, we should make this point strongly to Sargsian. His support will be necessary (though perhaps not sufficient) to any Armenian willingness to meet the Turks halfway in even first steps.
THE VEXING “GENOCIDE” ISSUE — NO ARMENIAN CAN STAND AGAINST IT
¶9. (C) Sargsian has a pragmatic view and no wish to anger Washington or Ankara on the sensitive AGR [Armenian Genocide Recognition] issue. If asked about the issue, however, as he is likely to be, he has no option, politically, but to voice support for an AGR. When the HFAC passed the resolution, Sargsian was quoted in local papers saying “For every Armenian the issue of the Armenian genocide is special, and we must be grateful to those people working to promote it and those members of Congress who voted for it.” Sargsian is smart enough, however, to handle this issue with discretion and sensitivity, and not seek to embarass any interlocutor with the issue.
ENHANCING THE IRAQ DEPLOYMENT
¶10. (C) DASD Cagan’s recent visit (septel) sought to convince the GOAM to double to about 100 soldiers its troop contingent in Iraq. Sargsian understands that his full agreement to this enhancement of forces will be sought and expected in Washington. Cagan made clear that the additional Armenian troops would be trained and equipped by the United States out of special coalition support funds, not deducted against Armenia’s FMF/IMET funding. Sargsian sees the value of having Armenian troops train and operate alongside U.S. and Allied forces, but remains wary of overstretch of Armenia’s small peacekeeping battalion, as well as of the political risks in an election year that would accompany additional Armenian casualties in Iraq.
IRAN
¶11. (C) Armenia’s relationship with Iran has been a frequent irritant in the U.S.-Armenia relationship. Armenia believes fervently it has no choice but to have friendly relations and economic ties with its southern neighbor, including the recent construction of the (so far idle) Iran-Armenia natural gas pipeline. The GOAM sees the latter as a strategic necessity, to give Armenia an alternate source of energy in the event that a Georgian-Russian crisis cuts off natural gas shipments from the north. We have pointed out to the GOAM at every opportunity that if Armenia helps Iran export its gas onward to a third country this energy barter arrangement would be transformed into a deal that could trigger U.S. sanctions under the Iran Sanctions Act. We also repeatedly make the point that in the current Iranian stand-off with the UN and IAEA over its illicit nuclear program, this is no time for “business as usual” between Armenia and Iran. We have repeatedly cautioned the GOAM not to allow Armenia to become a vehicle for Iranian propaganda efforts. Sargsian, who has spoken positively of the Iranian relationship on a number of occasions, will expect this issue to be raised in Washington, and he will seek to defend Armenia’s position.
SARGSIAN’S STYLE
¶12. (C) Sargsian keeps his own counsel and tends to be a man of relatively few words — a sharp contrast to the voluble and emotive Kocharian. He is soft-spoken and seeks to avoid confrontation. Sargsian’s Washington visit may be a learning experience for us all, as we see how he handles himself in different contexts. We believe him to be a cool-headed, rational, and methodical decision-maker, who can be persuaded by clear-eyed appeals to Armenia’s (or his own) best interests.
PERINA
