WikiLeaks-Armenia No 31
S E C R E T YEREVAN 000044
SUBJECT: ARMENIA SEEKS USG PERMISSION TO SELL WEAPONS TO IRAN
Classified By: Ambassador John Evans for reason 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (U) This telegram contains an action request. Please see para 7.
Summary
——-
¶2. (S/NF) On January 11, Armenian Defense Minister Serzh Sargsian asked the Ambassador what the U.S. view would be on a potential weapons sale to Iran. Sargsian said that the GOAM [Government of Armenia] is under increasing pressure from Iran, which recognizes Armenia’s isolation. He reiterated Armenia’s dedication to ongoing cooperation with the U.S. to combat terrorism and the proliferation of WMD. The Ambassador responded that the U.S. still viewed Iran as the number one state sponsor of terrorism. He thanked Sargsian for approaching the USG [United States Government] before it made any decision and said he understood Armenia’s need to tend its relations with Iran. He agreed to pass on the request, but said that Washington’s view of any transfer of weapons to Iran would certainly be negative. End Summary.
¶3. (S/NF) Armenia’s Defense Minister sought a one-on-one meeting with the Ambassador following a January 11 meeting on other defense-related issues (septel). Sargsian told the Ambassador that the GOAM had been approached by Iran regarding the sale of an anti-air missile system. Sargsian characterized the S-75 system as antiquated, surplus equipment and noted that Armenia had just decommissioned a couple of them; proceeds from the sale would be welcome as the MOD budget is facing shortfalls. (Note: open sources state that the S-75 or SA-2 Guideline was converted by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq into a short-range ballistic missile. End Note.) Sargsian stressed that the system was “defensive.”
¶4. (S/NF) Sargsian said that Armenia was under increasing pressure from Iran to expand relations. Armenia’s borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan remain closed and Armenia is dependent on Iran as a source of imports. Sargsian explained that for an extended period when access to goods via Georgia was limited because of unrest, Iran was Armenia’s lifeline. Sargsian said that Iran’s ambassador in Yerevan sought to meet with him almost every two weeks and was stepping up the pressure for the MOD to visit Tehran.
¶5. (S/NF) Sargsian said that Armenia remained committed to working with the USG to combat terrorism and was cooperating with the U.S. on the border with Iran to contain the spread of WMD. Armenia will continue to ensure full transparency with the U.S. in its relations with Iran.
¶6. (S/NF) The Ambassador thanked Sargsian for bringing the potential weapons sale to our attention before a deal was concluded and agreed to forward it immediately to Washington for consideration and response. But the USG continued to consider Iran as the number one state sponsor of terrorism and a U.S. approval of a weapons sale to Iran would be extremely unlikely.
Action Request
————–
¶7. (S/NF) Request Department guidance on how to respond to Sargsian, including a description of how ILSA would affect Armenia should the GOAM decide to proceed with the sale.
Comment
——-
¶8. (S/NF) While Sargsian’s approach shows a certain degree of naivete or at least unfounded optimism, his readiness to vet this sale with us also demonstrates that he values the relationship with the USG. While we anticipate Washington’s negative reaction to this sale, we note that, at present, Armenia has little choice but to develop its relationship with Iran. If we approach this relationship with some understanding, we should be able to maintain some leverage. We want to encourage Armenia to maintain her policy of transparency regarding relations with her southern neighbor, and would like to forestall her sliding into an even more intimate embrace with Tehran.
EVANS
