WikiLeaks-Armenia N 128
2010-01-11
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 000013
SUBJECT: COVER ME, COVER YOU? PM SARGSIAN JOINS RULING PARTY
YEREVAN 00000013 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: CDA Joseph Pennington, reasons 1.4 (b,d).
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SUMMARY
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¶1. (SBU) The recent decision by Prime Minister Tigran Sargsian, two of his ministers, and a cohort of their reformist colleagues to join the ruling Republican Party of Armenia (RPA) has the political rumor mill in Yerevan churning. Some pundits view the unexpected development as a move taken by President Serzh Sargsian, the leader of the RPA, to shore up his political base and keep the ambitious Speaker of Parliament Hovik Abrahamian at bay. Others view it as a necessary move by the PM to keep competitors at bay and to secure his job. Some speculate that the President is strengthening his defenses in anticipation of the inevitable political assaults should his signature foreign policy move rapprochement with Turkey — fail. END SUMMARY.
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PM SARGSIAN, OTHER REFORMERS JOIN REPUBLICANS
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¶2. (SBU) On November 17, an RPA spokesperson unexpectedly announced that Prime Minister Tigran Sargsian (no relation to President Sargsian) had joined the RPA, and was selected to join the party’s Executive Committee, the RPA’s top decision-making organ, headed by President Sargsian. A week later, on November 25 (three days before the RPA’s annual convention), it was announced that the PM’s two leading pro-reform colleagues, Economy Minister Nerses Yeritsian and Finance Minister Tigran Davtian, along with the PM’s chief of staff, a deputy finance minister, and five other senior government officials close to the PM, also joined the RPA. (Note: Neither the PM nor his two ministers had any recent political affiliation, with the PM serving as the nonpolitical governor of the Central Bank of Armenia from 1998-2008, until his appointment as PM. End Note.)
¶3. (SBU) None of the officials commented on their decision to join the RPA. RPA spokesperson and MP Edward Sharmazanov told the media that the PM’s decision should not have come as a surprise, “because Tigran Sargsian is a representative of President Sargsian’s political team and the Republican Party council supported his appointment as prime minister.” PM Sargsian’s first public comment on his decision came on December 25, when he noted in an interview that “I have always appeared on behalf of that political team which was providing guidance to the President of the Republic.” (Note: In the 1990s, Sargsian was a member of the National Democratic Union, a once-influential opposition group, but dropped any political affiliation once he became the CBA governor. End Note.)
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VARIED REACTIONS TO PM’S MOVE
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¶4. (SBU) Depending on their political affiliation, local pundits have sought to spin the PM’s and his allies’ joining the RPA in ways that advance their own agendas. Levon Zurabian, Coordinator of the 17-party opposition Armenian National Congress, derided the move, sarcastically commenting that “I guess that’s a stage through which everyone in that criminal-oligarchic clan must go — so we congratulate Tigran Sargsian on joining the mafia.”
¶5. (SBU) Noting that a lack of a “political support base” had been a problem for the PM, Ara Nranian, an MP from the nationalist opposition Dashnaktsutiun party, saw the move as the PM’s attempt to shore up his own position and “prolong the existence of his government.” The RPA MP Karen Avagian said he saw no political machinations behind the PM’s decision, and refuted speculation that the RPA forced the PM to join it, arguing that “everyone decides for himself which party to join.”
¶6. (SBU) But Yervand Bozoyan, a local political analyst, stated that dissatisfaction had been brewing inside the RPA about the PM’s apparent reluctance to join its ranks since becoming PM in April, 2008. Bozoyan noted that “if the prime minister is one of them (a member of the ruling party), the authorities certainly feel stronger.”
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YOU COVER ME, I’LL COVER YOU?
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¶7. (SBU) Richard Giragosian, director of the Armenian Center for National and International Studies (ACNIS) think tank in Yerevan, told us that he viewed the move as one made by President Sargsian to make him less vulnerable to challenges to his rule. By bringing the PM into the ruling party, the PM — and by extension President Sargsian — are less vulnerable to “palace coups” orchestrated by party insiders in opposition to the government’s unpopular policies.
¶8. (SBU) Among the president’s and prime minister’s perceived vulnerabilities, the tortuous normalization process with Turkey figures at the top of the list. A misstep here, particularly one that involves one-sided concessions on Nagorno-Karabakh to secure an open border with the Turks, could throw open the door to political challengers. Meanwhile the PM struggles to overcome the 18 percent drop in Armenia’s 2009 GOP, most of which was a result of the prevailing global financial crisis, but which was exacerbated by Armenia’s lack of economic diversification.
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KEEPING SPEAKER ABRAHAMIAN AT BAY?
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¶9. (SBU) Often cited as the leading candidate to become Armenia’s next prime minister — before perhaps making a run at the presidency — is the ambitious Speaker of Parliament Hovik Abrahamian, who managed Serzh Sargsian’s 2007 parliamentary election and 2008 presidential election campaigns. Abrahamian’s intentions, according to many observers, became more evident when his son married the daughter of Armenia’s most famous and likely its most wealthy business tycoon, Gagik Tsarukian, last fall. Tsarukian, leader of the Prosperous Armenia party (the RPA’s junior partner in the ruling coalition), is widely viewed as an ally of President Sargsian’s predecessor, ex-President Robert Kocharian. Recently there have been media allegations that Abrahamian and Tsarukian are coordinating their political actions with Kocharian, in preparation for challenging President Sargsian should Sargsian make a political decision viewed as contrary to Armenia’s national interests.
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COMMENT
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¶10. (C) When President Sargsian chose the technocrat CBA governor to be his prime minister, many predicted that PM Sargsian would not remain long in office, given his lack of political affiliation and benefactors in the rough-and-tumble world of Armenian politics. And as long as PM Sargsian has been in office, rumors have circulated of his imminent ouster, with the rumors peaking in intensity whenever the PM announces an anti-corruption measure or policy that appears to step on the toes of the oligarchs. The PM has defied the pundits and the rumors, however, in large part because of the quiet yet steady backing of President Sargsian.
¶11. (C) We believe that by bringing the PM and his allies under the protective “roof” of the ruling RPA, and placing the PM on the party’s Executive Committee, President Sargsian has effectively signaled that an attempt to undercut the PM is essentially an attempt to undercut the RPA — which he leads — and thus himself. The message is targeted toward those within the RPA who may have an eye on the PM’s chair or higher, and those who don’t like the president’s normalization or Nagorno Karabakh policies. It’s less likely a message to the oligarchs about reforming their business practices, as President Sargsian and the RPA cannot afford jeopardizing the financial and organizational support that these actors provide at election time — no matter what the PM may have in mind.
¶12. (C) As the prospects for normalization grow dimmer, perhaps dealing a significant blow to President Sargsian’s reputation as steward of Armenia’s national interests, the President needs to ensure that his hold on power is secure and internal threats kept in check. One way of doing this is to make his prime minister a stronger political figure who will protect his back during the bumpy road ahead. And in the process, the PM himself becomes a more formidable player who will have a bit more latitude to pursue his reform agenda.
PENNINGTON
