Serzh Sargsian: a micro maven, a macro disaster – Interview with Edgar Martirosyan

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Interview with Edgar Martirosyan, a practicing attorney in Los Angeles, CA

Yerevan’s two-week SasnaTsrer standoff with police and the events surrounding the standoff ended with the surrender of the gunmen. How would you assess the events themselves and what possible consequences and impact they can have on the society and on the political developments in Armenia as a whole?

Edgar Martirosyan – We cannot view this standoff in isolation, but must consider the impute of the last two weeks in context of the previous crises the ruling administration has faced since coming to power. Ultimately, what we were starkly reminded of in the last two weeks is that we, in Armenia and abroad, have yet to learn lessons of import both from our own history and that of others. By and large this was yet another sad chapter in the story of our infant state. If, however, we can overcome our own limitations, this chapter may have shown some signs of promise, nonetheless.

For his part, Serge Sargsian has proven to be a masterful tactician. Whether it was March 1st, the Turkish-Armenian Protocols, Barevolution, Electric Yerevan, or the this standoff, Sargsian has been able to distinguish himself as a tactful, cunning and calculated political maven who has managed all of the crises faced by his administration in such a manner as to further consolidate his power at home and secure political dividends abroad in their ultimate resolution. March 1st became Kocharian’s legacy and not so much his; Turkey blinked first when it came to the Protocols; Raffi Hovannisian’s Heritage party was effectively dismantled thanks to Sargsian’s handling of Barevolution; and the Russians were forced to concede some ground as a result of Electric Yerevan.

Now, with his handling of the Sasna Tsrer standoff, Sargsian has arguably delivered a significant blow to oppositionists throughout the country in the short-term, while simultaneously attempting to restore parity at the negotiating table on the Artsakh [Nagorno Karabakh] front. Most of the Founding Parliament leaders find themselves behind bars, and other opposition supporters such as Davit Sanasaryan, Armen Martirosyan, Andreas Ghukasyan, and Hovsep Khurshudian are as of this writing arrested, possibly facing prosecution on trumped up allegations.

But if Sargsian is a micro maven, he is a macro disaster. He has no credibility whatsoever with his constituents at home, and has actively eroded any remnants of a foundation of democratic governance in the country.  In order to secure his dominance, Sargsian not only continued but expanded upon Kocharian’s policy of propping up an ignorant, largely dull National Assembly comprised of a HHK [ruling Republican Party headed by Serzh Sargsyan] super majority easily controlled by its handlers, and as a result has effectively become a hostage of the very kleptocracy he played a major role in engineering by juxtaposing their interests with that of the state’s.  And while his short term gains are impressive from a purely partisan perspective, the long term devastation caused by his administration will perhaps be felt (and maybe then properly recognized) long after he has left the ivory tower of power in Yerevan.  In essence, to remain in control of the state, Sargsian’s HHK has eroded all principles of statehood, turning the entire country into the private playground of a handful of loyal cronies.

But this factional, shortsighted approach to politics isn’t specific to Sargsian and his HHK.  Unfortunately, the entire political landscape of the country seems to be so inclined.  In this regard the Sasna Tsrer did not provide a fundamental difference in political philosophy; they merely presented themselves as a benevolent alternative to the current disliked authorities. They meant well, was basically what they were saying, and with the scepter of moral superiority in hand, the movement spawned by them, if successful, would govern well. Their only capital of credibility (and by extension, political philosophy) was some of the armed men’s involvement in the NKR [Nagorno Karabakh] War; these were, after all, Freedom Fighters, who had laid their lives on the line for the preservation of a national identity. Instead of interests and tactics and strategies, they would wield the sword of morality, ethics, sentimentality, and patriotism.  But, 14 days after the siege began, that particular sword – the one of moral indignation, sentimentality, and righteous vexation – proved too heavy, too unruly, and eventually had to be put down.

But this does not mean that the Sasna Tsrer did not succeed in awaking the Armenian consciousness. These men, many of whom have indeed been committed to the betterment of their state for the majority of their lives, have effectively surrendered their liberty in hopes of inspiring a movement. Whether that movement takes shape and form and manifests itself successfully will depend on whether we can learn from their mistakes, and in recognition of their sacrifice and for the sake of their cause, not make them moving forward.

Do you think the response of certain civil society groups was adequate to the situation? And how would you comment on the involvement of some of their representatives in the process?

Edgar Martirosyan – Well, first we need to understand exactly what this civil society we speak of aims to achieve and how.  Once that is clearly articulated, we can perhaps then implement the necessary measures of success and attempt to gage whether the means adopted will lend themselves to achieving the ends contemplated. But articulating missions, visions, and ideologies does not seem to be our forte. And so long as these things are lacking, civil society in Armenia will largely remain a reactionary force prone to disappointments.

Obviously during all this time there was a leadership problem of protesters. What do you think was its reason?

Edgar Martirosyan – Indeed there was. And frankly, unless and until the above-mentioned issues are addressed, these problems will only persist. Within days, a number of individuals interjected themselves into the standoff as either arbiters of sort or leaders of the street protests. Those who decided to sit out in the beginning felt compelled to come out of hibernation as the standoff dragged on. A sense of urgency seemed to settle across the entire opposition block; a vacuum of leadership had presented itself, and they could play a role in filling it. But how? With what means? What was the plan? What was the strategy for action? Why? In other words, again, there was no vision, no clear mission, and no ideological mandate whatsoever.

Ironically, the one political player who received the most flack for attempting to “capitalizing” on the Sasna Tsrer’s operation, but in fact did so the least, was Nikol Pashinyan.

That is not to say that Pashinyan did not place himself atcenter of the crisis. He did. But to expect that a politician who is the de facto face of a burgeoning opposition party would sit back and not attempt to lead by example is both shortsighted and foolish. What was he supposed to do? Further escalate an already tense situation and potentially foster clashes with police? Or put aside his and his party’s political principles, and succumb to the various emotionally charged destructive calls for violence?

In fact, unlike anyone else who took to the stage in those trying days, Pashinyan spoke with a sense of vision, at least attempted to identify a mission, and raised his hands with open palms facing out in a sign of peaceful resistance to police brutality.

Lastly, we still have not transcended the politics of personality. Not a single political force in Armenia – perhaps other than the Republican Party and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation – has succeeded in creating an institutional platform for its political participation. If there is no leader, there is no party. And so long as this is the model of change we cling to, we’re not going to solve this leadership problem; it’s just going to wax and wane.

What conclusions should be made by the authorities, political parties, civil society and generally by all of us, including Diaspora?

Edgar Martirosyan – The political landscape in Armenia is changing, and not necessarily out of our own volition.  The events of the last two weeks were in some ways very telling that we, as a nation, are struggling in not only adapting to the geopolitical realities of the region, but also keeping pace with the shifting tectonic plates of global security and order. We are currently witnessing the emergence of a regional world order where your weight at the international table is increasingly depended on what you bring to it. At what point do we realize that that damn paper ladle will become soggy and wet?

But I believe we can overcome the small-minded factionalism of our political reality, be it at home or abroad. Our prism can be fixed on long-term goals and prosperity, not just immediate gratification of shortsighted and ill-defined politics without policies.  We must give birth to visions, missions, and strategies, and transcend the plane of personalities.

In short, for almost 140 years now we’ve needed an iron ladle. Perhaps finally, when it matters the most, we can attempt to forge it.