Karabakh conflict is getting harsher and more dangerous, yet there is still time left for peace
Tatul Hakobyan, Yerevan
JAM news, http://www.jam-news.net/Publication/Get/en-US/1612
First attempt: not to let the war be levied
It was September 1991. The Soviet Union had been agony-ridden for already a few months. A year before that, in August 1990, the Parliament of Armenia and its non-communist leadership had passed the declaration of independence, thus setting in motion the process of peaceful withdrawal from the USSR.
In March 1991, Azerbaijan and its communist leadership voted in the referendum for preservation of the USSR. The referendum on preservation of the USSR was not conducted either in Nagorno-Karabakh or Nakhichevan. However, the August coup d’état spoiled the whole game. Finally, at the end of August 1991, Azerbaijan proclaimed the independence and a couple of days later, on September 2, so did Nagorno-Karabakh, though it was not recognized by any of the countries, including Armenia.
Boris Yeltsin decided to engage in conflict. He was elected the President of Russia in June 1991. Having had profound political differences with Gorbachov, Yeltsin expressed intention to stand as a mediator in the Karabakh issue. In order to powerlift and attach more significance to his mediation, he paid a visit to the Caucasus together with the President of Kazakhstan – the USSR’s second largest country. Thus, the first Russian President initiated the first attempt of mediation in Karabakh conflict resolution issue.
On September 21-23, Yeltsin and Nazarbayev visited Baku, then, through Ganja, they travelled to Stepanakert, then left to Yerevan and finally arrived in Zheleznovodsk, North Caucasus. On September 24, in Zheleznovodsk, they signed a joint memorandum, bearing the signatures of four leaders: Yeltsin, Nazarbayev, Levon Ter-Petrosyan and Ayaz Mutalibov. The Karabakh side – Robert Kocharyan, Leonard Petrosyan and Vagif Jafarov, participated in talks in the capacity of observers.
Kocharyan was then a political leader in Karabakh and a supporter of Ter-Petrosyan in Nagorno-Karabakh (NK). The latter was the NK key official in NK – the Chairman of the Regional Council. Vagif Jafarov was the mayor of Shushi – the largest city in the NK, populated by Azeris.
Zheleznovodsk memorandum suggested taking the following measures to stop the almost broken out war:
• invalidation of all “anti-constitutional acts, adopted with regard to Nagorno-Karabakh’ (in particular, the matter concerns the NKAR Regional Council’s decree, dated February 20, 1988, under which Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region expressed intention to withdraw from Soviet Azerbaijan and join Soviet Armenia, as well as Azerbaijan’s decree of November 28, 1989, abolishing NKAR administrative entity);
• ceasefire;
• withdrawal of all armed units, except for the USSR internal troops, from the conflict area.
A 10-point memorandum was to take its effect on January 1, 1992.
However, on January 1, the world’s greatest power – the USSR, ceased to exist on the political map. Mikhail Gorbachev filed resignation, whereas the USSR internal troops, that were the last force, preventing bloodshed between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, left the conflict area.
War: January 1992 – May 1994
Following the collapse of the USSR, Armenians and Azerbaijanis engaged in hostilities, that lasted until May 1994 truce and claimed the lives of over 12 thousand Azerbaijanis and 6 thousand Armenians.
The political map also changed. Armenians, who, before the hostilities, had dreamt of integrating into Soviet Armenia the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region (NKAR), with its territory amounting to 4.4 thousand sq.km, in May 1994, actually gained control not only over Nagorno-Karabakh, but also 7 thousand sq.km adjacent areas: full control over 5 Azerbaijani districts (Lachin, Kelbajar, Kubatly, Jabrail, Zangelan) and partial control over 2 districts (Agdam, Fizuli).
Azerbaijani armed forces, in turn, established partial control over Martakert and Martuni districts of Nagorno-Karabakh region, as well as gained full control over Shaumyan district and Getashen sub-district.
Since the May 1994 truce until present, the international mediators have offered the conflicting parties five proposals or projects, each focusing on the following key elements:
- Nagorno-Karabakh status,
- return of the territories under control of the Armenian troops,
- return of refugees and deported individuals back to their homes,
- security guarantees.
Second attempt – “package” and “stage-by-stage” resolution schemes
In summer, and later, in autumn 1997, the OSCE Co-Chairs offered Baku, Stepanakert and Yerevan, first, the “package” and then the “stage-by-stage” schemes of conflict resolution.
After the May 1994 truce, the negotiations were held in the capitals of different countries, some of them members and some – non-members of the OSCE Minsk Groups: Moscow, Helsinki, Vienna, Paris etc. In January 1997, the OSCE Troika (the main consultative body of the OSCE Chairmanship) was formed. It comprised three geopolitical power centers: Russia, USA and France (representing the EU’s interests). During 1994-1997, a separate delegation from Nagorno-Karabakh participated in all rounds of talks.
Azerbaijan could not come to terms with this fact, but it neither prevented nor hampered the negotiations. Azerbaijan was actually negotiating with Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, whose positions on key issues might not necessarily coincide. Nizami Bahmanov, the last mayor of Shushi of Azerbaijani nationality, also participated in talks. In contrast to the Karabakh delegation, that sat at the negotiation table separately from the Armenian side, he was included in Azerbaijani delegation.
There was a need for the ‘stage-by-stage’ scheme, because Stepanakert flatly rejected the first-proposed “package” scheme. It was unacceptable for Armenia too, but Yerevan preferred to let Stepanakert reject it.
Both, the ‘package’ and ‘stage-by-stage’ proposals, provided for the actions as follows:
- withdrawal of Armenian troops from all NK adjacent areas, except Lachin (that implies not a corridor, but the entire Lachin district);
- deployment of international peacekeepers in the area between NK and Azerbaijan;
- return of the deported population to their permanent place of residence.
The principal difference between the ‘package’ and ‘stage-by-stage’ schemes laid in the paragraph concerning the status of NK. Under the ‘package’ scheme, NK was provided maximum autonomy within Azerbaijan, which was unacceptable for Yerevan and Stepanakert. Whereas the ‘stage-by-stage’ option did not address the status problem at all, putting that very controversial issue on the back burner.
Baku considered both – the ‘package’ and the ‘stage-by stage’ schemes as acceptable. Yerevan agreed to the ‘stage-by-stage’ one, though with some reservations. However, Stepanakert rejected both proposals, and that was not a pre-planned trick on part of Armenia and NK.
Stepanakert authorities claimed, there was no principal difference between the ‘package’ and ‘stage-by-stage’ variants, since in both cases the status issue would be resolved in favor of Azerbaijan. In case of ‘package’ solution, in exchange for return of six districts, Nagorno-Karabakh would receive just broader autonomy within Azerbaijan. In case of ‘stage-by-stage’ solution, six districts would be returned and the status issue would be left hanging in the air. It was obvious that having regained six districts, Azerbaijan would not agree in future to grant NK the independence that Stepanakert was aspiring for.
During his well-known press conference in September 1997, as well as in his extensive article ‘War or Peace?’, published in November of the same year, Ter-Petrosyan tried to convince the Armenian public that the “stage-by-stage” option was that very maximum that Nagorno-Karabakh could get. However, he encountered no only the public’s resistance, but also that of his own team.
As a result, Armenian Defense Minister, Vazgen Sargsyan, who was killed in a terrorist attack in the Armenian parliament two years later, as well as Karabakh wing of the government, headed by Prime Minister Robert Kocharyan, actually forced Ter-Petrosyan to resign.
Third attempt – ‘common state’
A year later, end of 1998, the OSCE Minsk Group presented a new settlement proposal, referred to as the ‘common state’. The author of this document was then-Foreign Minister of Russia, Yevgeny Primakov.
Yerevan accepted the proposal with reservations, Stepanakert – with serious reservations, while Baku flatly rejected it.
As regards the elimination of consequences of conflict, the ‘common state’ concept was no different from the previous two documents. The main difference was again in the paragraph concerning the Nagorno-Karabakh status. As it was pointed out right in the beginning of this proposal, ‘Nagorno-Karabakh is a territorial and state entity in the form of a republic, forming a common state with Azerbaijan within its internationally recognized borders.’
Thus, a creative approach was manifested, that allowed not to violate the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, but, at the same time, as part of this integrity, Nagorno-Karabakh was actually becoming an independent entity. ‘De jure not part of Azerbaijan, de facto – an independent state” – the following sophisticated wording was used with regard to Nagorno-Karabakh in the diplomatic circles those days.
The ‘common state’ principle implied that Nagorno-Karabakh would have its anthem, emblem and flag, the national guard and the police, whereas the official language would be Armenian. Nagorno-Karabakh residents would have Azerbaijani passports with a special mark ‘Nagorno-Karabakh’. They would be entitled to elect their representatives in the Parliament of Azerbaijan, to run in presidential elections. NK could not have its embassies, but it could have its representatives in the embassies of Azerbaijan in different countries.
Heydar Aliyev claimed, the proposal was unacceptable for Azerbaijan, because two independent states were actually formed within Azerbaijan, and Baku would have no control over Stepanakert. There were also some other comments, made by Baku. For instance, Vafa Guluzade, Ilham Aliyev’s advisor, expressed concern that if Azerbaijan accepted that proposal, then Karabakh Armenian would be able to become the president of Azerbaijan.
Fourth attempt – exchange of territories
Kocharyan-Aliyev bilateral talks were launched in Washington, in spring 1999. As a result, the so-called informal Key West document was elaborated in spring 2001.
Unlike the previous three documents, this document, that Azerbaijan rejected once again, was not finally published. The only known is that it was partly based on the philosophy of territorial exchange. Nagorno-Karabakh would have gained a road to Armenia through Lachin corridor, whereas Azerbaijan would have been granted as a compensation the land access to Nakhichevan through Meghri district in southern-most Armenia.
Nagorno-Karabakh, including Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region’s entire area – 4.4 thousand sq. m. km., would have joined Armenia, whereas 7 thousand sq. m. km area under the control of Armenian armed forces, would have been transferred to Azerbaijan.
It is noteworthy that Key West Island, which is located in the state of Florida, is the place where Ernest Hemingway wrote his brilliant piece – ‘A Farewell to Arms.’ The negotiations were held in the proximity talks format: presidents communicated with go-between persons in two separate rooms.
Mediators listened to the parties’ demands and concerns and based on that drew up the conflict settlement project. US Secretary of State, Colin Powell arrived in Key West for the settlement of Karabakh conflict, whereas on the presidents’ way back they were received by George W. Bush in Washington.
As Heydar Aliyev had stated in Baku airport before his departure to Key West, he was ready to go even to Antarctica for the sake of settlement of Karabakh conflict. However, upon his return home, Aliyev welshed on the preliminary agreements, reached in Key West. Meanwhile, Robert Kocharyan was sharply criticized in Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Diaspora for his intention to cede the lands to Azerbaijan and give up on Meghri.
Fifth attempt – postponed referendum
A new stage of negotiations, commonly referred to as the Prague process, was launched since 2004. In 2006, in the Rambouillet castle in Paris outskirts, the parties seemed to be so close to reaching an agreement on common principles.
The key novelty of the Prague process was the idea of a pending referendum, which implied the following:
• Karabakh forces withdraw from five districts;
• Kelbajar return issue is decided parallel to Nagorno Karabakh referendum
However, the negotiations came to the deadlock again, this time due to the parties’ failure to agree on Kelbajar return schedule and Nagorno-Karabakh referendum timeframe. Lachin corridor also remained a subject of dispute.
In November 2007, in Madrid, the OSCE Minsk Group Co-chairs handed to Yerevan and Baku a 14-point document, which was also based on postponed referendum philosophy. It was a working document, rejected at different stages of talks either by Armenia or Azerbaijan, depending on which item had undergone change.
The Madrid principles included the following provisions:
- The final legal status of Nagorno Karabakh shall be determined through a plebiscite, that will provide Nagorno-Karabakh population with opportunity to express their will freely and genuinely.
- During the interim period, until the final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh is determined, its population shall enjoy certain rights and privileges
- All Azerbaijani territories around Nagorno-Karabakh, that are under Armenian control, will be returned under Azerbaijani control.
- A corridor of agreed width will link NK to Armenia.
- All internally displaced persons and refugees from the conflict-affected areas will have the right to voluntary return.
- The international peacekeeping forces will be deployed as soon as the Peace Deal takes its effect.
Today
Since 1994, there has not been any rapprochement in parties’ positions even on certain details. Moreover, spiced by military rhetoric and hostile propaganda, they have become even harsher. The ceasefire regime has been violated so often and there have been so frequent subversive actions and shelling of each other’s territory over the past two year, that it could be said that ceasefire regime is no longer valid.
One can offer a lot of reasons and name the guilty. However, the main reason is that the parties to the conflict, who are seeking peace, do not actually want to pay for it. There will never be peace until the societies are ready to pay the price for it.
Tatul Hakobyan – a journalist, coordinator at ANI Foundation for Armenian Studies, an expert at Civilitas Foundation. Author of the books: “Karabakh Diary: Green and Black” and ‘The View from Ararat: Armenians and Turks.’
Published: 31.03.2016
