WikiLeaks-Armenia No 77
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 YEREVAN 000218
SUBJECT: EUR DAS BRYZA MEDIATES POLITICAL CRISIS IN YEREVAN
Classified By: CDA Joseph Pennington, reasons 1.4 (b,d)
SUMMARY
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¶1. (C) EUR DAS Matthew Bryza visited Yerevan March 6-8 to consult with key leaders on Armenia’s post-election political crisis. He met the President, Prime Minister (twice), Foreign Minister Oskanian, opposition leader Levon Ter-Petrossian (LTP), and a range of other politicians, civil society representatives, and the diplomatic corps, as well as the government ombudsman. President Kocharian held a tough “law and order” line — insisting that arresting and punishing those responsible for post-election violence would solve the problem. PM/President-elect Sargsian signaled understanding that the issues are more complex, that demonstrators were more protesting the GOAM [Government of Armenia] than supporting LTP, and his readiness to reach out to other political forces. Ter-Petrossian insisted his campaign’s behavior was legal and peaceful and would remain so; authorities precipitated crisis with use of force. LTP insisted he would participate in talks with the GOAM only if the GOAM honors his right to peaceful protest demonstrations once the State of Emergency (SOE) is lifted. Other opposition leaders affirmed the need for multi-partisan political dialogue to get Armenian democracy back on course. NGO representatives passionately protested the flawed elections and authorities’ post-election behavior. END SUMMARY.
PRIME MINISTER: POSITIVE COMMITMENTS, SECURITY FEARS
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¶2. (C) Probably the most important interlocutor was Prime Minister/President-elect Serzh Sargsian. Bryza met him in a formal setting March 6, and in an informal one-on-one March 7 for two hours. In the first meeting, Bryza welcomed Sargsian’s cabinet statement earlier in the day that called for political dialogue, and affirmed that that is the right strategy. He said it was important to end zero-sum, all-or-nothing formulations between political forces. Sargsian agreed, and noted that Armenians are still struggling to build their democracy. He said everyone was pressuring Armenia to lift the SOE, but he was dubious of the wisdom of this. The PM commented that democracy and reform cannot proceed without public order. Who, he asked, would be accountable for keeping Armenians safe? The U.S. State Department? The European Union? He emphasized that the guilty must be punished — citing several inflammatory sins committed by the mob March 1-2 — and said the GOAM needs international understanding and support. The PM argued that the SOE provides a cooling-off period, and prevents media from writing inflammatory things. Bryza said that while the USG [U. S. Government] calls for SOE to be lifted, we are prepared to think practically, and recounted statements by some NGO leaders that for a short while emergency measures can be necessary in some circumstances. The “day after” the SOE would come very soon, however, and the PM must urgently begin a political process to de-escalate tension and ensure SOE does not increase public anger. Bryza expressed concern over reports of people being detained without access to lawyer or family. Sargsian said it was LTP who had used such methods while president, but the current government would not. Bryza replied that full, transparent information from the government would help dispel any myths. Authorities must show even-handedness in prosecuting both pro-government and opposition law-breakers, including police if they used illegal force. Sargsian and Bryza each hinted that President Kocharian was likely to take a much more aggressive line against LTP and the demonstrators, and, being stubborn, represented a difficult problem to get around so long as he remained in office. On LTP, Sargsian asked how he could negotiate with a man who called government leaders “traitors” and “mongol-tartars.” If LTP continues down this path, the country will treat him as an outcast. Bryza said he would make the point to LTP that he was going down the wrong path.
¶3. (C) Sargsian was more relaxed and frank during his second, private meeting with Bryza. Sargsian confided that the SOE — or at least prohibitions on demonstrations — might be extended beyond the initial March 20 term, unless LTP would promise to postpone any protest rallies until after he April 9 inauguration. With such a commitment from LTP, Sargsian would be prepared to lift the media blackout, possibly cancel the SOE early, and enter roundtable talks with LTP to chart a political way ahead. Bryza undertook to convey this message, via emboffs, to LTP. Sargsian also indicated that arresting LTP would be a public relations disaster, and one that he would oppose, though President Kocharian might insist on going forward with this. Bryza urged Sargsian to step up as the national leader by reaching out to civil society, ending arrests of opposition leaders, restoring media freedoms, lifting the SOE, and prosecuting those who violated election laws and/or unlawfully used violence. Sargsian assured that there would be no general round-up of opposition politicians and organizers, and that only those guilty of real crimes would be prosecuted. Sargsian conceded that the vast majority of demonstrators were protesting the Armenian Government, rather than expressing spontaneous support for LTP. He recognized Kocharian’s hardline approach was damaging his (Sargsian’s) legitimacy with voters, and said he was reaching out to civil society quietly, in his own way, hoping word-of-mouth would gradually garner him support.
PRESIDENT: A TOUGH ACT TO FOLLOW, OR JUST A TOUGH ACT?
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¶4. (C) President Kocharian treated Bryza to a lengthy and impassioned apologia for the government’s actions on March 1-2, and a detailed indictment of the LTP camp’s sins. He entirely imputed blame for each and every act of mob violence to LTP personally and the entire March 1 protest generally, which he insisted was planned and orchestrated in every detail by LTP’s team. He rejected the premise that any of the demonstrators on March 1 protest were simply disenchanted with the government and hoping to air their grievances, or that the numbers were anywhere near as high as have been reported. He also went out of his way to try to prove that all the pre- and post-election demonstrations were much smaller than independent assessments have reported, stating that 10-11,000 was the maximum. Kocharian signaled his intention to arrest and prosecute a broad swath of those he deemed responsible for creating the political crisis, while insisting that authorities have been above reproach in every instance. Bryza ventured that the course Kocharian seemed set on was destroying the reputation of President-elect Sargsian, who needed to build his credibility and democratic credentials with the Armenian people and the international community. Kocharian said he took full responsibility — all the while insisting there was nothing wrong to take responsibility for — and if people want to blame anyone, they should blame him. Bryza assessed that a continued government crackdown would only raise tension. Kocharian disagreed, expressing confidence that opposition zeal would fade if the GOAM remained firm.
TER-PETROSSIAN: TALKS REASONABLE, ACTIONS LESS CLEAR
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¶5. (C) Bryza met March 7 with ex-President Levon Ter-Petrossian. LTP opened with discussions of Nagorno Karabakh (NK), asserting that the current regime had accomplished nothing in the past ten years to settle the conflict, and were negotiating on very similar policy ground to what LTP himself had been doing as president. He said the status quo in NK was dangerously unstable, but congratulated the Minsk Group Co-Chairs for expanding his (LTP’s) step-by-step concept into a concrete and viable proposal. Moving to domestic politics, LTP insisted that his campaign and supporters had never broken any laws. They were protesting peacefully when authorities violently ejected them from Freedom Square the morning of March 1. LTP and his circle could not be held accountable for the violence that ensued later in the day, because they had had no control over that, as he himself had been under house arrest, and his senior lieutenants arrested or in hiding after the brutal police action. LTP complained about the Sargsian side’s propaganda (alluding to a “documentary” aired on a pro-governmental station February 14 that called LTP an Israeli agent and the son of a Turk; septel). LTP called the SOE illegal, noting that the Constitution allowed for an SOE to be declared in accordance with legislation, but that the required implementing legislation to govern SOEs had never been enacted. LTP emphasized that he is ready for political dialogue at any time, and he fully supported the approach outlined in the Slovenian EU Presidency statement March 4, which called for dialogue and an international inquiry into the March 1-2 events. LTP insisted he had never and would never demonstrate illegally, but fully intended to call a rally with authorities’ proper permission once the SOE is lifted. Bryza encouraged LTP to enter into dialogue with PM Sargsian to chart next steps to strengthen Armenian democracy. LTP agreed to dialogue with Sargsian only on the condition that the GOAM would permit legal street demonstrations after the SOE’s expiration on March 21. He commented that under Armenian law, authorities do not have the legal right to refuse altogether permission to demonstrate, though they can decline to allow it at a specific place and time, while providing alternatives. (NOTE: While the government and most other observers believe LTP’s nine-day Freedom Square rally was illegal, his team have previously shared with us tortured legal reasoning to the effect that the law allows spontaneous public gatherings, and the rally in question had coalesced spontaneously. Since it never came to an end, this “spontaneous” rally, they claim, remained legal for the duration. END NOTE.)
¶6. (C) CDA and polchief met again with LTP March 8, after Bryza’s departure, to convey Sargsian’s message (paragraph 3) that if LTP would defer seeking to rally before the April 9 inauguration, Sargsian would lift the media ban and possibly the SOE altogether, and enter roundtable talks that include LTP. LTP replied that this seemed an empty gesture. Once the SOE expired it was the LTP camp’s right to organize peaceful, legal rallies. He said that this was the only means that the government had left open to him for communicating with the people, commenting that the prime minister has all the national television channels at his disposal to convey any and all messages to the public. LTP said that if the government would grant him access to television, then public rallies might not be necessary. Polchief met March 10 with PM adviser Levon Martirosian to convey the idea that LTP would be willing to eschew rallies if the government granted television access instead. Martirosian was not empowered to speak for the PM, but seemed profoundly skeptical about this idea. He promised to convey to the PM, however. To date, no response has been received.
ARTUR BAGHDASSARIAN: THE FLIP-FLOP MAN
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¶7. (C) Bryza met Artur Baghdassarian, the now-I’m-opposition/now-I’m-government former speaker of parliament, who signed an agreement February 29 to once again join the governing coalition. Baghdassarian insisted that, despite widespread opinions to the contrary, his party rank-and-file remained fully loyal to him and now committed to the government, now that he had joined PM Sargsian in exchange for the position of Secretary of the National Security Council. Baghdassarian — who just weeks ago had been a leading voice of criticism of the regime, and whose top surrogate, Heghine Bisharian had appeared at Freedom Square’s podium alongside LTP — now claimed that LTP represented only a tiny percentage of the Armenian electorate, while together he and PM Sargsian constituted a large majority. He echoed Sargsian and Kocharian’s indictments of LTP’s post-election behavior and ascribed to LTP full responsibility for the mob violence that erupted March 1.
THE HOVHANISSIANS: VAHAN AND RAFFI
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¶8. (C) DASHNAKSUTYUN: Vahan Hovhanissian was the presidential candidate of the century-old Armenian Revolutionary Federation (or Dashnaksutyun) party. Hovhanissian said both the government and LTP sides were equally to blame for the current crisis, and neither had legitimacy. He had campaigned on the theme of “neither the bad past nor the bad present leaders”, but had been disappointed that it did not gain traction, as the public was caught up in the battle of the titans: Sargsian vs. LTP. Both sides now are equally intransigent, holding to maximalist positions that would serve to lengthen the political crisis. Hovhanissian outlined a reasonable and moderate way forward. He said the PM needs to show leadership and humility by agreeing to sit down with credible opposition figures (he thought that LTP himself would not be possible in the near term) for a frank discussion of what has gone wrong in Armenia’s political culture. Sargsian should be prepared to hear some tough truth-telling from other political leaders, including Vahan himself, about the government’s flaws and failures, and agree mutually to measures to correct these problems. He also felt the government must take steps to build a more inclusive, independent, and truly non-partisan television and radio regulatory commission, putting an end to the one-sided propaganda that now emanates from the state-run broadcasting channels.
¶9. (C) Heritage Party leader Raffi Hovhanissian, who endorsed LTP shortly before the election and spoke at a post-election LTP rally on Freedom Square, said he held the authorities fully responsible for the events of March 1-2. The President’s decision to clear the square of demonstrators was the triggering event for the violence. Hovanissian added that while he had been uncomfortable with some of LTP’s campaign rhetoric, actions by the authorities on election day and in the post-election period had precipitated the current crisis. Dismissing Baghdassarian’s switch to the Government side, Hovhanissian suggested that many of Baghdassarian’s supporters were now — by default — in the LTP camp. With Orinats Yerkir supporting the GOAM and the Dashnaks, (ARF) position unclear, Heritage was now the only remaining opposition party in the parliament. Hovhanissian said he would look for ways to play a constructive role in easing Armenia’s political tension, and was generally supportive of the roundtable proposal being floated by the Dashnaks. He added that he would continue his contacts with LTP, and urge the former president to carry out his opposition through legal channels.
GOVERNMENT HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDER
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¶10. (C) Bryza also met the Armenian government’s Human Rights Defender (Ombudsman), Armen Harutiunian, who had been an entirely tame government supporter until witnessing the events of March 1, after which he released a critical statement that provoked an angry public broadside from President Kocharian. Harutiunian told Bryza there was equal fault between the government and LTP camps for the recent unrest. However, he said the deeper problem lay in Armenians’ mistrust of their own government, and in a system where oligarchs exert undue influence, checks and balances are absent, freedoms limited, and citizens feel they have no say. Armenia is an angry and divided society, he said. Harutiunian commented that authorities’ current strategy of demonizing the LTP camp was likely to provoke more clashes, while the media blackout prompted widespread belief in outrageous rumors and “black PR.” Authorities must also stop arresting opposition politicians. He proposed several confidence-building measures to restore political norms, including giving the opposition more voice in the television and radio regulatory commission and Central Election Commission, and extending a negotiation offer to LTP to reconcile differences. Harutiunian thought both Kocharian and LTP were each committed to extreme positions, but PM Sargsian could be persuaded to take a more enlightened approach, and be made to understand that LTP’s base of supporters represent a legitimate voice of dissent. Harutiunian praised the PM’s statement earlier that day at the weekly cabinet meeting — which was later publicized by the government — that authorities shared partial responsibility for the events March 1, and urged ministers to engage in dialogue with society.
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CIVIL SOCIETY BLASTS CRACKDOWN
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¶11. (C) Five civil society leaders representing different sectors warned Bryza that the situation could deteriorate even further in the absence of swift measures to lift the state of emergency and engage in dialog with the opposition. All five agreed that the authorities were abusing the 20-day-long state of emergency to go after perceived enemies and reinforce their grip on power, at the risk of creating long-term negative consequences for stability. They appealed to the United States and the international community at large to apply pressure that would force a change of attitude.
¶12. (C) All of the civil society leaders laid the blame for the current situation on the authorities, and their heavy-handed tactics in both clearing Freedom Square and dealing with its aftermath on March 1. Tamara Gevorkian, a former Deputy Minister from the Labor and Social Affairs ministry gave an impassioned eyewitness account of what she saw in person on March 1, and accused the authorities of provoking the violence. She said she and her family had been threatened after she spoke on the square during the 11-day-long protests.
PENNINGTON
