WikiLeaks-Armenia No 48
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 YEREVAN 001249
SUBJECT: DEFMIN SARGSIAN REVEIWS N-K, IRAN, AND ELECTION ISSUES DURING AMBASSADOR’S FAREWELL CALL
Classified By: Ambassador John M. Evans, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Sargsian lauded the growing bilateral defense relationship, before complaining about Azerbaijan’s approach to the Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations. He said that Azerbaijan constantly revises its demands, and called for the Minsk Group Co-Chairs to demand greater consistency from the Azerbaijani side. Ambassador called on Sargsian (as a top ruling-party leader) to weigh in for clean elections in 2007, to which Sargsian agreed. Sargsian took the Ambassador’s point about arms-length relations with Iran, and commented the Armenian-Iranian relationship was superficial and driven mostly by Armenia’s critical energy needs. Ambassador advised of EUCOM GEN Ward’s upcoming visit, which Sargsian welcomed.
END SUMMARY
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GOOD TIMES IN THE DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP
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¶2. (C) The Ambassador’s September 5 farewell call on Defense Minister Serzh Sargsian found the minister in good spirits about the growing warmth in the bilateral defense relationship. Ambassador reviewed some of the key landmarks during his tenure: U.S. assistance in the development of Armenia’s new National Security Strategy (NSS), the successful deployment of Armenian troops in Iraq and Kosovo, and growing momentum in the FMF/IMET programs. He thanked the minister for his personal support for these initiatives, which began with Sargsian’s decision to support a Defense Assessment, and noted his expectation that this cooperation should continue, full steam, notwithstanding his own departure. The Ambassador assured Sargsian that Ambassador-designate Hoagland was a consummate professional, and predicted the two would get along well. He also advised Sargsian of the 19-20 September visit of EUCOM Deputy Commander GEN Ward, commenting that Ward enjoyed a sterling reputation. The ambassador proposed that Sargsian explore the feasibility of visiting the Armenian troops deployed in Iraq.
¶3. (C) Sargsian responded in kind, with effusive appreciation for the deepening bilateral defense relationship, and for the Ambassador’s role in fostering it. He expressed hope that Ambassador-designate Hoagland would call on him soon after arrival, and continue the tradition of close cooperation. Sargsian said his ministry had made a policy of complete openness with the U.S. Embassy and the U.S. advisers on the NSS, hiding nothing. He welcomed the many seminars and training opportunities the U.S. has provided the MOD. He stated that Armenia wanted to give NATO a warm reception. Sargsian said he would inquire with GEN Ward about the possibility of a visit to Iraq.
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BEWARE THE PERSIAN NEIGHBOR
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¶4. (C) The Ambassador cautioned Sargsian–in his role as chairman of Armenia’s National Security Council–to be cautious about Armenia’s ties with Iran, and especially to consider the bad optics of broadening or deepening those ties as the UN Security Council deliberates on sanctions against Iran. At the same time, he encouraged Armenia to look for opportunities, during its routine contacts with its southern neighbor, to encourage Iranian officials to turn aside from the country’s defiant posture against the international community. Sargsian was dismissive of the Armenian-Iranian relationship. He said that some trade was inevitable, particularly to satisfy Armenia’s critical needs for diversification of energy sources. Sargsian said that the bottom line was that Armenia is dependent on gas, and it was “better to have two pipes than one.” Beneath these superficial commercial relationships and certain people-to-people connections at the grass-roots level, the two governments had quite different values and interests, precluding a close friendship. Sargsian felt that neither Armenia nor Russia would have any success in altering Iran’s outlook.
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N-K: THE EVER-SHIFTING POSITIONS OF AZERBAIJAN
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¶5. (S) The Ambassador broached Nagorno-Karabakh, urging Armenia to stick with the Minsk Group (MG) negotiation process, even if (when) the talks hit rough patches. He pointed out that a credible negotiating process is a stabilizing factor in the region; should that process break down, that fact alone could have destabilizing consequences. Sargsian agreed, but confessed his government sometimes toyed with the idea of just such a dramatic gesture of displeasure as withdrawing from the MG process. He thought the negotiations might be a waste of time if Azerbaijan refused to deal seriously, and was pessimistic of the chances for a near-term solution. The minister suggested that the U.S. review its own satellite imagery over the last few years and examine the positions of the two sides, defensive entrenchments. He said such a review would show the inexorable advance of Azerbaijani positions, moving the Line of Contact toward the Armenian side.
¶6. (S) Sargsian complained at some length that Armenia could not trust the Azerbaijani leadership to negotiate in good faith and keep its word. Azerbaijan’s demands constantly shift, always demanding some new concession. He predicted that even if a peace deal were agreed between the two sides, Azerbaijan would keep coming back for more concessions. He called for the MG co-chairs to get tough with Azerbaijan, and not tolerate this continual shifting of the goalposts. “Speaking quietly to Azerbaijan is like not speaking at all” he commented, saying Azerbaijan only hears firm and forceful interventions. Sargsian also complained about the steady stream of bellicose rhetoric from Baku this year, contrasting it with Yerevan’s restraint, and taking this as further evidence Azerbaijan is not serious about negotiating with Armenia, but only posturing. Ilham Aliyev says one thing in MG negotiations, and then goes straight home to make inflammatory proclamations in Baku. Sargsian supported the co-chairs’ publication of the basic principles after the latest round of negotiations, commenting that this level of public transparency was helpful. Sargsian also stated he was convinced the co-chairs should have published this information much earlier.
¶7. (S) Sargsian thought renewed military conflict unlikely, because Armenia would not launch hostilities, and (he asserted firmly) Azerbaijan was quite incapable of doing so. Sargsian expressed appreciation for U.S. leadership in the South Caucasus. He said that the level of sniping incidents on the Line of Contact had decreased sharply following President Aliyev’s trip to Washington. He offered this as an example to prove that forceful engagement works well with Azerbaijan.
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THE DEMOCRATIC ROAD
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¶8. (C) Noting Sargsian’s role as a top official of the ruling Republican Party, the ambassador affirmed the need for Armenia to perform much better than in the past in the conduct of elections. Sargsian agreed this was imperative, and said President Kocharian clearly understood the great importance of fair elections. He went on to complain of the irresponsible and destructive behavior of Armenia’s fractious opposition parties, who boycotted parliament and had refused to play their appointed role in the constitutional referendum. He said opposition leaders failed to comprehend they had an important civic role to play even when they are not in power. The opposition parties just wanted to boycott, criticize, and obstruct anything the government tried to undertake, regardless of its merit. They thus abdicated the role that a political opposition was supposed to fill: to have a valid debate on issues. Sargsian warned that no matter how properly the elections are conducted, there would be local politicians who would seek to inflate minor violation and discredit the process.
¶9. (C) In an odd tangent, Sargsian related with sardonic humor a telephone conversation he said he had had with an Armenian journalist who had published (supposedly) unfounded accusations against him. What was he supposed to do, he asked the journalist, in response to such scurrilous reporting? Should he send thugs to the journalist’s house to seek retribution? No, that’s out of bounds. Could he seek redress in the courts? No, the courts were corrupt and ineffective. He was powerless to respond effectively to his name being unfairly blackened.
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DEALING WITH SARGSIAN
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¶10. (C) Well-turned out in a fashionable suit-and-tie, Sargsian was friendly, frank, and engaging, with both sides speaking exclusively in Russian. He was fully confident on all topics from defense issues to democratic process. Normally the most even-tempered interlocutor, on this occasion Sargsian grew more animated in his irritation with Azerbaijan’s recent behavior.
EVANS
