WikiLeaks-Armenia No 41
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 YEREVAN 000238
FOR AMBASSADOR STEVEN MANN AND UNDER SECRETARY BURNS
SUBJECT: ARMENIAN FM OSKANIAN REFLECTS ON RAMBOUILLET
Classified By: Amb. John M. Evans, for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Foreign Minister Oskanian was not as pessimistic about the results of Rambouillet as we had anticipated when we heard him reflect on the event and on his views of the way ahead February 15. Although agreement eluded the two presidents at Paris, it was Oskanian’s view that many issues had been resolved, and that there was still hope for a settlement. Oskanian not surprisingly put the blame on the Azeri side for failing to accept a deal that would restore five of the seven occupied territories immediately (“even tomorrow”) and all of them (save a slice of Lachin) in the long run. Oskanian said he was eager to hear what the co-chairs would conclude after their early March consultations in Washington. Some of what Oskanian said obviously was practiced “spin,” but we came away wondering whether progress before (or at) the St. Peterburg G-8 might yet be attainable. END SUMMARY
¶2. (C) Foreign Minister Oskanian briefed Yerevan-based Ambassadors February 15 and I had a short private meeting with him thereafter. Although he has been quite guarded on such occasions in the past, this time Oskanian was quite frank about what had been on the table and what the problems were. While the ground rules for Oskanian’s briefings call for confidentiality, this time it was clear that the Foreign Minister was attempting to put a positive spin on what had happened the previous weekend, and we can expect a similar line to emerge in the public domain. He admitted that there had been no success at Rambouillet, but said that if the Presidents had agreed, the result would have been a full set of agreed basic principles, so it was “not a total failure,” and “the basis for a solution is still strong.” He went on to say that the two Presidents might take a second shot at reaching agreement, and confirmed that Ministers would continue their discussions.
¶3. (C) Oskanian next dwelt on the context in which the Paris talks had taken place and reviewed the longer-term perspective. He reminded everyone that until comparatively recently, the positions of both sides had been “maximalist,” with Armenia saying that there could be no return of occupied territories until the question of Nagorno-Karabakh’s status was resolved, and Azerbaijan conversely saying that until the territories were returned, status could not be discussed. Armenia had modified its position to say that it would consider the return of some of the territories if the right of self-determination was recognized, even in a delayed form. He recalled that the one-pager under discussion at Paris called for recognition of the right of self-determination in exchange for return of five of the seven occupied territories.
¶4. (C) Oskanian stressed that agreement foundered on the linkage between the last two territories (Kelbajar and non-corridor Lachin) and the referendum on status of N-K. He characterized the Azeri position in Paris as toughened over previous stated positions, in which the idea of a referendum in Karabakh had been fully accepted. He dated the toughened Azeri position to the London FMs’ meeting in January. Asked about the legal point that according to the Azerbaijani constitution a referendum had to be of the entire Azeri nation, Oskanian pointed out that formulations could be found to avoid this, or else the constitution could be amended, given that Aliyev has only six parliamentarians in opposition.
Azerbaijan can have Five of Seven Territories “Tomorrow”
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¶5. (C) Oskanian stressed that Baku could have five of the seven occupied territories back and start resettling all but maybe 25,000 of the million or so refugees, and the question of Nagorno-Karabakh’s status would still be in the balance. Were this to happen in the context of a more positive atmosphere, with borders opened and social and economic ties starting to heal, the current dynamic would be transformed. Oskanian admitted that it could be tough for President Aliyev to sell such a deal, but he argued that the opportunity should be seized for the good of the entire region. He stressed that the deal was still on the table, that Armenia would not backtrack, and that Azerbaijan could get five of the territories back “even tomorrow.”
¶6. (C) Moving to the question of rhetoric, Oskanian first denied the rumor reported from Baku that Kocharian had left Rambouillet early on account of the death of MoD Sargsian’s father-in-law. The talks had run their course. He went on to condemn statements (ascribed to an unnamed Azeri figure) about “wiping Armenia off the map” and hinting at a military solution by saying that “Azerbaijan’s patience is not unlimited.” Armenia’s patience might also wear thin, he added, saying that Armenia cannot simply wait for an Azeri attack, and can do things to strengthen its defense posture. He expressed the hope that the most extreme rhetoric in Baku did not reflect the thinking of top officials there.
¶7. (C) Asked whether he thought there was a chance for progress prior to St. Petersburg, Oskanian said “yes.” He said the Presidents had asked him and his Azeri counterpart to work on the details of what had already been agreed. The co-chairs, he reported, were cool to this idea, and he understood their reluctance in this regard. Still, he maintained, the opportunity to make progress continued to exist. “One good sentence could do it, he said.” He was eager to hear what the co-chairs would conclude at their meeting in Washington.
¶8. (C) In my brief private meeting with Oskanian, I asked him whether reports and speculation about the possible outcome of the Kosovo status deliberations were having any effect on Armenian thinking. He said they were not. I also asked him whether post-Rambouillet might not be a good time to put more of the issues out for public discussion in Armenia. He said that he had noticed that most of the key issues had by now gotten out (he cited especially the Radio Liberty report from last week that was, as he put it, “extremely accurate”) and were being debated. This should, he said, be encouraged.
¶9. (C) COMMENT: In view of what we have heard so far about the outcome of Rambouillet, it is hard to credit Oskanian’s relatively upbeat take on the meeting, unless it was something like Reykjavik in 1986: a failure in formal terms, but encouraging for what was put on the table. As sympathetic as we are to the argument that there is not enough time to “do a deal” before the G-8 in St. Petersburg, we are led to wonder whether it makes sense to throw in the towel altogether at this point. As with so many of the long-running conflicts, the best one can often do is manage them, prevent them from getting worse, and keep hopes of a resolution alive so as to forestall precipitate actions by either of the sides or by non-state actors. We wonder if the question of how to press the parties towards a major step forward by the time of the G-8 might figure on the agenda of the consultations that Under Secretary Burns is scheduled to have with Russian DFM Karasin February 21. END COMMENT.
EVANS
