At the turn of the twentieth century, two opposing directions were being outlined in the political life of an Armenia deprived of statehood. The first was recognising the Ottoman Empire as an enemy and relying on a so-called third power, chiefly Tsarist Russia. The other direction was the idea of the exclusion of a third power and taking into account Armenia’s own strengths, entering into dialogue with neighbours, and even making painful compromises, if necessary.
Armenia was divided between Tsarist Russia and Ottoman Turkey when these two empires were destroyed. The Armenian political forces, primarily the ARF-Dashnaktsutyun, which was the most influential political party, were faced with what seemed to be an irreconcilable choice. By 1919, Armenian political thought had started to turn towards Europe, towards European allies who had emerged victorious from the First World War, in contrast to the defeated Russian and Ottoman Empires, which were fragmented and had been drawn into internal battles.
In the words of Ruben [Ter-Minasyan], one of the ARF leaders, relying on the Allies became the pivot of policy. Therefore, by relying on the Allies, it was not possible to rely on Ottoman Turkey as well and negotiate with it separately, as Turkey was an opponent of the Entente. Besides, “In1919, Russia and Turkey were corpses which could have been the subject of division and never, ever the basis of our foreign policy. With this reasoning, agreement with Turkey was considered impossible, dangerous and unimportant.”
Certain figures, Ruben and Hovhannes Kajaznuni in the first place and also later several historians later on, were convinced that it was more urgent for Armenia to have reconciliation with the Kemalists or attempt to achieve that end (even with limited borders) than, being carried away by the Treaty of Sèvres, to hold out hope of assistance from European allies or America. In the months of June and July of 1920, when Mustafa Kemal [Atatürk] was in a tight situation, would dialogue with the Kemalists not have saved a part of Armenia and restrained the Kemalists from fighting against Armenia? Ter-Minasyan thought that Armenia’s interests demanded reconciliation with Kemalists. The few that thought like him intuitively felt that the correct way was to find dialogue with the Turks, but they were not psychologically prepared to go against the mindset of Armenian political thought of the time.
However much Russia and the Ottoman Empire were considered corpses involved in bloody battles internally and externally, they continued to be decisive forces in the issue of Armenia’s fate. Those leaders of Armenia, both partisan and governmental, who ignored the power and danger of the Turks were the exception, writes Ter-Minasyan. On the contrary, the majority, and in particular the ARF Bureau, were aware that no matter how shattered the Ottoman Empire was, it was a great danger and destructive if the Armenians and Turks were to face each other as opponents. This was the general opinion concerning the Turks, but there were differences of opinion on the method of preventing the danger. These can be divided into two main groups.
The small group, according to Ter-Minasyan, thought that since the Turks, even in a depressed state, were more powerful than the Armenians, “it is better to negotiate with them and if possible create an independent, united Armenia with modest borders.” However, questions which were almost impossible to answer or predict in 1919 were being posed to those who thought like this: “Firstly, which Turkey should be negotiated with – Constantinople or the Millis [Turkish national movement]? If Constantinople were to agree to our minimum demands, would the Millis not oppose it and would there then not be even more enmity? Do those two or one of those two actually want to concede anything? If they compromise and reach an agreement, won’t the Allies treat us as friends of the Millis rebelling against them? Will the Armenian people, after having lost one million martyrs, be able to tolerate Armeno-Turkish friendship?”
The European and American allies of Armenia, or those perceived as such, taking into account several factors including Armenia’s weakness and Turkey’s strength, were advising the Armenians to come to terms with the Turks and be satisfied with the minimum.
In September of 1919, US President Woodrow Wilson had commissioned General Harbord to Armenia to study the country and examine the conditions of the proposed mandate. In Sebastia [Sivas], Harbord had had a meeting with Mustafa Kemal, who had just initiated the Milli movement. According to Harbord, Kemal had requested that he convey to the Armenian government that the Armenians should give up the Allies and immediately come to an agreement with the Turks.
According to Armenia’s Prime Minister Alexander Khatisyan, “One day Harbord said in my office that he had brought greetings from Rauf Bey, the chairman of the government in Ankara. Rauf Bey had expressed a desire to begin immediate negotiations with Yerevan. Harbord advised us to begin negotiations. We did not follow his advice, believing that our issues would be resolved in Paris.”
In Ruben’s words, there were three main strains of thought concerning the future of the country in the autumn of 1919 in Armenia.
The first, those who knew Armenia, who understood the situation and were familiar with Armenian and Turkish strengths, were of the opinion that the country could not continue to exist without external military assistance, or even without the establishment of foreign authorities. This current was divided into two main branches. A small group had its eyes on the Allies, and the larger part on Russia, since the withdrawal of the Allies from the Transcaucasus was clear for all to see. Those who were waiting for salvation by Russia included Dro, the soldiers and officers of the Armenian forces.
The second current was comprised of those figures who didn’t understand the power and psychology of either the Armenians or their opposing Tatar-Turks. This current did not deny the independence of Armenia. On the contrary, independence was a necessary condition for them and they wanted “to see Caucasian Armenia, which had been divided into twenty parts, united.” But they did not understand the serious reason which had made the Turks and Tatars of Zangibasar, Koghb, Vedi, Sharur, Nakhijevan, and other locations rebel against Armenia.
The third current was convinced that the reason for the Muslim riots were not the shortcomings of the Armenian government, “but the yearning of the Muslim population to destroy the government from within and establish an Azerbaijani or Turkish authority.” This current did not believe that it was possible to destroy the Muslims’ agenda with ingratiation or even autonomy, nor did it believe that placing any hope on the Russians was of any use. “They wanted to create an Armenian physical force and get rid of the existing chaos through weapons.”
In Ruben’s words, the republic’s leadership could see the isolation of Armenia, Georgia’s unclear position, Azerbaijan’s enmity, the unappeasable Turks, and the rebelliousness of the local Muslims. Although Armenia was separated from Russia, nevertheless the desire of the Armenia leadership had always been to create friendly relations with it.
Armenia shared no common boundary with Russia, nor was it directly linked with the Volunteer Army, yet both were integral to its foreign policy. Armenia had taken the road to independence, but she hoped that a benevolent Russia would relieve the severe pressures exerted by Georgia and Azerbaijan, neutralise the constant threat of a rejuvenated Turkey, safeguard the thousands of Armenian refugees in Russia, and authorise the established Armenian communities there to send material aid to Yerevan.
To which Russia should Armenia turn – the Sovnarkom at Moscow, the Volunteer and Cossack centre at Yekaterinodar [Krasnodar], Kolchak’s regime in Siberia, or perhaps the anti-Bolshevik administrations and armies of the Baltic and the Arctic? Any one or combination of these could conceivably emerge as the final victor in Russia.
In Ruben’s words: “Our expectations and attitude were the same towards all of them, without preference for one or the other. Many thought that the base of the future Russian authority would be Kolchak. That was the reason why, with great difficulty, we had designated Dzamoyan as the Armenian representative. We could not anticipate immediate help from the Kolchak government because, even if there had been any such desire on his part to help Armenia, it was impossible, as he was cut off from Armenia by distance and many small and large authorities. In spite of being fully aware of this, we valued Kolchak’s recognition of Armenia’s independence.”
Armenia cautiously attempted, therefore, to win the sympathy and recognition of all. Announcing neutrality in the raging Russian civil war, the Yerevan government made it known that Armenia would stand as a trusted friend and neighbour of any Russia, as long as that Russia would respect the independence of the republic. Semi-official Armenian representatives travelled to Moscow, Yekaterinodar, Rostov-on-Don, Murmansk, Omsk, Irkutsk, and other headquarters of the several Russias of 1918-1919. Still, considerations of geographic proximity and potential aid led Armenia to concentrate her efforts upon the Command of the Armed Forces of South Russia.
In 1919, Kolchak and Denikin were equal forces. Denikin ruled from the Volga to the valleys of the Terek and Don, reaching almost to Moscow. Besides, a broad stratum of the Armenian population (in particular, the military) supported having relations with Denikin. He was adjacent to the Caucasus and the allies were also helping him. According to Ruben [Ter-Minasyan], “Apart from those political calculations, we had in hand expectations of Denikin: to get Armenia recognised, to defend the hundred thousand Armenians living under his authority and to receive grainand armaments, which were so essential to us, from Russia. Our representative Saghatelyan was with Denikin and his, Zinkevich, was with us. In the middle of 1920, from those in Denikin’s circles, Armenia received three million bullets for Mosin rifles. This, when there were only 150 thousand bullets for ten thousand rifles left in our arsenal. Armenia got little assistance of grain and food as the Georgians took their share.”
To be contiunued
From Tatul Hakobyan’s book – ARMENIANS and TURKS
Image – Denikin and Wrangel
