Turks Ask Armenians to Withdraw from Two Villages

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Note- This chapter is from Tatul Hakobyan’s book- ARMENIANS and TURKS

In 2011, during a conference, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu said: “The Armenians think that the normalisation of relations will simply occur with the opening of the border and diplomatic relations. Nothing will change with simply opening the border. There is an entire list if issues that must be included for an overall resolution process. If anything happens on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border, where shots ring out daily, will we again close the border? If that happens, all prospects for establishing relations and a resolution to the conflict would collapse over the long haul. We cannot permit ourselves to lose Azerbaijan for the sake of relations with Armenia. We have asked President Sargsyan and I have proposed to my colleague Nalbandyan on numerous occasions to withdraw from one or two of the occupied territories as a face-saving gesture for Azerbaijan. For example, to return Fizuli or Aghdam, in which case Ankara would be willing to also open its border. Armenia refused.”

After the independence of Armenia in 1991, Turkey has had fifteen foreign ministers, seven prime ministers, and four presidents, who, without exception, have demanded, in public speeches and negotiations, that Yerevan satisfy its preconditions, the first being territorial concessions to Azerbaijan, in return for the establishment of relations.

During his four years as Armenia’s foreign minister (during 1993-1996), Vahan Papazyan met with five of Turkey’s ministers of foreign affairs. He says that Ankara took improving Armenian-Turkish relations seriously. “But what was more important was that Turkey genuinely accepted Armenia as an independent state. The meetings with Çetin, Soysal, İnönü, Baykal, and Çiller were quite candid. Armenia and Turkey had nothing to hide from one another; the issues were obvious and there was no need to play at diplomacy. In order to open the borders and establish diplomatic relations, Turkey presented less demands than it does today,” Papazyan recalls. “How sincere was it? I cannot say. I can remember one detail, which might shed light on this question. In October 1996, I met with Çiller at Turkey’s UN mission. She literally said, ‘Withdraw from two occupied villages and I promise that we will open the border.’ I told her that I would return and discuss it. We discussed it with Ter-Petrosyan and decided that it was not the right thing to do because, first of all, there were no guarantees that they would do so and secondly, I had this suspicion that they were simply testing us. We did not respond, especially since soon after I was no longer minister.”

Another foreign minister of Armenia, Alexander Arzumanyan, is familiar with this story. Arzumanyan negotiated with Çiller on February 7, 1997, on the sidelines of the BSEC meeting of foreign ministers. “Çiller said that if we withdrew from two symbolic villages, so that they had something to tell their Azerbaijani brothers, they would be willing to open the border. French Foreign Minister Hervé de Charette travelled to Yerevan from Turkey for that specific question. He was very excited and said that there was a new idea. I received him at the airport and he immediately told me that he had reached an agreement with the Turks. We were to pull out of two villages and they would open the border. It seemed that he was waiting for us to say, ‘What a great offer’. We explained to him that the Karabakh conflict has logic to it and that the mediation delegation must be able to discuss all issues,” Arzumanyan recalls. “President Demirel proposed the same to Libaridian as far back as late 1993. That offer was rejected because it is firstly a form of absolute pressure. Turkey is carrying out a wartime action towards our country. As a member of the Minsk Group, it is clearly defending Azerbaijan. Second, it’s not as if every mediator must make a proposal. The issue must be discussed in general and a general resolution found. Nagorno Karabakh is fighting for its right to self-determination. Give the right, the mechanism, and the people will decide the methodology and form,” he added.

Were the Turks actually ready to open the border in return for a withdrawal from two villages? Or were they simply trying to test the Armenians? Arzumanyan explains: “If we had taken the first step, it was assumed that it would open the door for the demand of the other territories. Later they would say, give us twenty villages. Well, let’s say they open the border, but that would be followed by a thousand and one questions. Everything that Armenia obtained at great sacrifice and loss of life would have been for naught and the only thing we would get back in return, open borders and diplomatic relations, are what the law demands anyway.”

Since it was Turkey that closed the border and refused to establish diplomatic relations, there was little for Armenia to do to break the ice. When the Turks proposed the idea of withdrawing from two villages, the Armenians, referring to the difficult socio-economic situation created in Nakhijevan, proposed that humanitarian assistance be sent there through Armenia via the Yerevan-Nakhijevan railway. It would be a justifiable reason for Turkey to operate the Kars-Gyumri railway so that assistance would reach the Azerbaijanis of Nakhijevan. Arzumanian says, “There was a change of government in Turkey. Generally speaking, governments and foreign ministers changed frequently. There wasn’t enough time to reach an agreement with anyone on any issue. The idea of operating the Nakhijevan railway met a similar fate. It would have been the first step towards opening the border.”

Arzumanian says that when he was foreign minister he also met with İsmail Cem and Abdullah Gül in addition to Çiller. “I conversed with Cem on the sidelines of conferences. He was an educated man and in private talks a much more interesting conversation partner. I met with Gül when he was in the opposition. I was foreign minister and we spoke in an Ankara hotel for two hours. Despite being an Islamist, he had more practical things to say than the secularists in power.”